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This paper studies thirty-one highly leveraged transactions (HLTs) of the 1980s that
subsequently became financially distressed. At the time of distress, all sample firms have operating
margins that are positive and in the majority of cases greater than the median for the industry.
Therefore, we consider these firms financially distressed, not economically distressed. The net effect
of the HLT and financial distress is a slight increase in value --frompre-transaction to distress
resolution, the sample firms experience a marginally positive change in (market- or industry-
adjusted) value. This finding strongly suggests that, overall, the HLTs of the late 1980s succeeded
in creating value. We also present quantitative and qualitative estimates of the (direct and indirect)
costs of financial distress and their determinants. Our preferred estimates of the costs of financial
distress are 10% of firm value. Our most conservative estimates do not exceed 23% of firm value.
Operating margins of the distressed firms increase immediately after the HLT, decline when the
firms become distressed and while they are distressed, but then rebound after the distress is resolved.
Consistent with some costs of financial distress, we find evidence of unexpected cuts in capital
expenditures, undesired asset sales, and costly managerial delay in restructuring. To the extent they
occur, the costs of financial distress that we identi' are heavily concentrated in the period after the
firms become distressed, but before they enter Chapter 11.
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Manyofthe highly leveraged transactions (HLTs) completed in the latter half of the 1980s
subsequently defaulted on debt pasments, filed for bankruptcy, and, in general, encountered financial
distress, Kaplan and Stein (1993a and 1993b), for example, find that more than 30% of management
buyouts completed after 1985 later defaulted. Kaplan and Stein attribute the increased default rates to
poorly designed capital and incentive structures while Jensen (1991) argues that regulatory shocks and a
downturn in the overall economy also played a role. -
Inthis paper, we study the effects and sources of financial distress for thirty-one HLTs from the
samples in Kaplan and Stein (1990 and 1993a) that became distressed. The analysis follows each HLT
from before the leveraging transaction to the resolution of financial distress.
We address two primary questions. First, we address how poorly (or well) the HLTs of the
second half of the l980s ultimately fared. Several of the defaults and failures of those HLTs involved
large well-known companies. These companies received a great deal of attention from the popular press,
most of which was negative and equated default with disaster.' Jensen (1991) argues that such defaults
were very costly. According to him, regulatory changes in the late 1980s and early 1990s "substantially
increased the frequency and costs of financial distress and bankruptcy." Ep. 26.]
In contrast, Kaplan (1989b, l994a, and 1994b) study one of the most celebrated defaults, that of
Federated Department Stores, and find that the original HLT increased Federated's value even after
taking into account the costs of financial distress and bankruptcy. Jensen (1989) argues that this
outcome should be expected when defaulting finns have substantial going concern value,
To address this first question, we follow the analysis in Kaplan (1989a, l989b, 1994a, and
I 994b) and estimate the value of each distressed HLT from before the HLT announcement until the
resolution of financial distress. Our findings are consistent with those predicted by Jensen (1989). We
For accounts of this attention, see Kaplan (1989b, 1994a, and 1994b).find that from pre-transaction to distress resolution, the sample firms experience a marginally positive
change in value --adjustedfor market or industry stock performance. This finding indicates that the
values of the distressed ElLis do not decline on average. Given that distressed HLTs did not lose any
value, it is highly likely that HLTs overall --distressedand non-distressed --createdvalue. This finding
is not consistent with the view that the HLTs of the later 1980s were unsuccessful.
Second, we address how costly financial distress is (both directly and indirectly) and what
determines those costs. Financial economists have found it difficult tomeasure the costs of fmancial
distress. The difficulty is driven by an inability to distinguish whether poor performance by a firm in
financial distress is caused by the financial distress or is caused by the same factors that pushed the firm
into financial distress in the first place. For example, Altman (1984) fmds large indirect costs of
financial distress, but does not distinguish them from negative operating shocks. Recent studies by
Asquith, Geriner, and Scharfstcin (1994), Gilson (1997), Hotchkiss (1995), and LoPucki and Whitford
(1993b) examine financially distressed firms and fmd indirect evidence that financial distress is costly.2
A large fraction of the firms in the samples in all of these papers, however, have negative operating
income, and, therefore, questionable value as going concerns. Those firms are not only financially
distressed, but also economically distressed, making it difficult to identify whether those papers measure
costs of financial distress or economic distress.
To address this second question, we first examine the factors that drive the sample finns into
fmancial distress. We find that high leverage is the primary cause of distress. Poor firm performance
and, then, poor industry performance play much smaller roles. More importantly, all of our sample
firms have positive operating income in the years they are distressed. In fact, the operating margin of the
typical firm exceeds the median for its industry, In other words, without their high leverage, our sample
2BothOfek (1993) and Opler and Titman (1994) study larger samples of firms that experience some fmancial
distress. Ofek finds evidence consistent with leverage reducing the cost of financial distress; Opler and Titman find
the opposite.
2firms would appear healthy relative to other firms in the industry. Because of this, we argue that these
finns are largely financially distressed, not economically distressed. Our analysis, therefore, attempts to
isolate the costs of "pure" financial distress.
We examine quantitative measures of operating performance for evidence of financial distress
costs. Operating and net cash flow margins of the distressed firms increase immediately after the HLT.
decline when the firms become distressed and while they are distressed, but then rebound after the
distress is resolved. The decline in margins from distress onset to post-resolution is 10% to 15%. The
change in margins from pre-l-ILT to post-resolution is negligible.
We then estimate the magnitude of the net costs of financial distress directly using capital values
--debtand equity market values. Our most likely estimates of these costs average 10% of firm value.
Our most consenative estimates do not exceed 23% of firm value.
Our analysis also considers qualitative measures of financial distress costs. The firms in our
sample appear to incur three such costs most frequently. First, a number of firms are forced to curtail
capital expenditures, sometimes substantially. Second, a number of firms appear to sell assets at
depressed prices. Third, a number of firms delay restructuring or filing for Chapter 11 in a way that
appears to be costly. In contrast, we find no evidence that the distressed firms engage in risk shifting I
assetsubstitution of any kind. (In addition to costs of financial distress, we also fmd benefits: a number
of finns cut costs and replace management.)
To the extent they occur, the costs of financial distress that we identify are heavily concentrated
in the period after the firms become distressed, but before they enter Chapter 11. We find little evidence
that Chapter 11 is inefficient or costly for our sample finns. This result is in agreement with recent work
by Alderson and Betker (1993), Gertner and Picker (1992), and Gilson (1997). The result also suggests
that the experience of Eastern Airlines, documented in Weiss and Wruck (1996) may be more the
exception than the rule.
3In our last set of analyses, we estimate the cross-sectional determinants of the costs of financial
distress. We find that these costs are negatively related to HLT value and the fraction of total debt owed
to banks, but are not related to capital structure complexity. the presence of junk bonds, the presence of
buvout sponsors. time in distress, or industry performance. These results are not consistent with
increased complexity increasing the costs of financial distress. They also suggest that costs of fmancial
distress have a fixed component. The results are somewhat supportive of Haugen and Senbet (I 978) who
argue that claimants in financial distress should be able to renegotiate without affecting the value of the
underlying firm. The results are less supportive of the arguments in Gertner and Scharfstem (1991),
Giammarino (1989). Wruck (1990), and others that greater bargaining conflicts and information
problems increase the costs of fmancial distress. The results also fail to support Shieifer and Vishnv
(1992), who argue that costs of distress increase as industryperfonnance declines.
We conclude the paper by discussing the implications and generality of our findings. Compared
to estimates of the direct costs of fmancial distress on the order of 3% of finn value (Weiss [1 our
estimates of the costs of fmancial distress--an average of 10% with an upper bound of 23% --appear
high. This would be particularly true if there is a selection bias in which firms with low costs of
financial distress are more likely to become highly leveraged.
Alternatively, from an ex ante framework that trades off expected costs of fmancial distress
against the tax and incentive benefits of debt, these costs of fmancial distress seem low.
While we acknowledge that both interpretations are plausible, we favor the latter and believe our
results are consistent with the views in Jensen (1989) and Kaplan (1994b) that financial distress is not
particularly costly in HLTs. To the extent that they generalize to mature finns, our results suggest that
the pure costs of financial distress are modest. Consistent with this generalization, the results in Opler
and Titman (1993) as well as two tests on our sample suggest that the selection bias in this sample is
modest or nonexistent.
4The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the sample. Section 3 describes the causes
of fmancial distress. Section 4 presents the valuation analysis. Section 5 presents both quantitative and
qualitative evidence of the costs of financial distress. Section 6 describes the cross-sectional
determinants of costly financial distress. Section 7 sununarizes our results and discusses their
implications and generality.
2. Sample selection and descnption.
The sample companies are taken from the HLTs in Kaplan and Stein (1990 and I 993a). Kaplan
and Stein (1993a) study 124 management buyouts completed between 1980 and 1989, in which (1) the
companies are originally publicly owned; (2) at least one member of the incumbent management team
obtains an equity interest in the new private finn; and (3) the total transaction value exceeds $100
million. Kaplan and Stein (1990) study 12 leveraged recapitalizations completed between 1985 and
1989. A leveraged recapitalization is similar to a management buyout in many respects except that it
does not involve the repurchase of all of a company's stock. While there is a dramatic increase in
leverage, public stockholders retain some interest in the company.
HLTs that subsequently become financially distressed are identified from searches of the NEXIS
database and from post-transaction financial statements. We use two basic measures of distress as of
December, 1995: (1) defaulting on a debt payment (possibly leading to a Chapter 11 filing); and (2) an
indication that the HLT has attempted to restructure its debt because of difficulty in making debt
payments. Companies that encounter some form of distress after a post-transaction releveraging are not
considered to have defaulted because the original transaction did not default.
As of December 1995, 31 of the 136 firms have defaulted. An additional 8 firms attempted to
restructure debt because of difficulty in making debt payments leading to a total of potentially 39
financially distressed firms. Consistent with Kaplan and Stein (1993a), the distressed firms are
5concentrated in later HLTs. with all but four completed after 1985.
We have obtained data for thirty-one of the thirty-nine financially distressed firms from the time
of the HLT transaction to the resolution of financial distress. Data on four firms were only partially
available either because the firms were sold very shortly after the HLT or because the firms lacked data
for several years during distress. Data on four firms were unavailable because the firms were private
when they became distressed and subsequently remained private. We do not know how these omissions
affect our results, if at all. It also is worth adding that our selectioncriteria likely exclude some firms
that experienced modest financial distress, but were able to restructure without defaulting and without
indicating they had difficulty making debt payments.
Data on the firms we have analyzed are obtained from SEC documents that describe the original
transaction, from post-transaction filings of 10-Ks, S-i registrations, prospectuses, and, plans of
reorganization, and from press reports available on NEXIS. Stock price data are obtained from the
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database and Standard & Poor's Daily Stock Pnce Record
Other financial data are obtained from the COMPUSTAT Tapes.
When we perform analyses that require an industry control group, we use the firms covered by
the Value Line Investment Survey that are in the same industry as our sample firms at the time of the
HLT. We use Value Lin&s classifications because they provide a well-known, economically-based, and
widely-accepted classification scheme. We also do so because of the well-documented inaccuracy of
CRSP industry classifications and the non-availability of historical SIC codes from COMPUSTAT.
Table 1 lists the thirty-one sample companies along with the date of the HLT, the nature and date
of distress, and the nature and date of the resolution of distress. Twenty-three of the sample firms
defaulted on their debt after the HLT. Eight firms successflflly restructured without defaulting.
Table 2 reports information about the value of the HLTs as well as the pre- and post-HLT capital
structures of the sample firms. The median total capital of the HLT transaction for these firms was $1
6billion. Table 2 also indicates that the 1-ILTs were indeed very highly leveraged after the transactions.
The median coverage ratio, the ratio of operating income before depreciation and amortization
(EBITDA) to interest expense, is only 1.16 in the first post-HLT year.
3, Reasons for financial distress.
In this section. we determine what factors led to the fmancial distress of the HLTs. We define
fmancial distress as the first year that a firm has EBITDA less than interest expense, attempts to
restructure its debt, or defaults. We refer to the first year of fmancial distress as year 0. Note that this
fiscal year often precedes the year of default (for firms that default).
Column 1 of table 3 shows that the median firm in the sample has an operatmg margin (EBITDA
/ Sales) of 9.8% in year 0. This median operating margin exceeds the 8.5% for the industry comparison
group. In other words, allthirty-onefirms have positive operating income and are, typically, more
healthy than the typical firm in the industry despite being financially distressed.
Those results contrast with those for the samples used in previous studies of the effects of
financial distress by Asquith et at. (1994), Hotchkiss (1995), and Gilson (1997). The median finn in
those studies has operating income roughly equal to zero.
Although the firms have healthy operating margins and operating income, column I of table 4
confirms that operating income at those firms roughly equals interest payments. The median interest
coverage ratio (EBITDA to interest expense) in the first year of financial distress is 0.98.
The rest of tables 3 and 4 explore the factors that led to distress in more detail. There are four
possible factors: (1) industry performance; (2) firm perfonnance; (3) short-term interest rate changes;
and (4) firm leverage. In table 3, we follow the analysis in Asquith et al. (1994) to measure the relative
7contribution of these four factors.3 To do this, we measure how much cash flow after interest (EBTTDA
net of interest expense) in sear 0 would have improved if (1) the firm performed the same relative to its
industry, but the industry performed at its median level in year-I --industryperformance; (2) the firm
performed as well as tile median firm in the industry in year 0 --firmperformance; (3) the firm paid
interest at the short-term interest rate in effect in year -I;and (4) the firm had the same ratio of interest
to assets as the median firm in the industry --firm leverage. The sum of all these changes would move
the sample firms' after-interest cash flow to that of the median firm. inthe industry in the prior year.
To calculate the relative contribution of each source, we divide the change in cash flow after
interest attributable to each source by the sum of the changes from all four sources. Table 3 indicates
that firm leverage is the primary cause of distress for twenty-six of the thirty-one HLTs and accounts for
a median of l04% of the shortfall in cash flow after interest. Even the 104% understates the importance
of leverage because leverage is responsible for a positive cash shortfall for two firms, RJRNabiscoand
Walter Industries, but the sum of the different sources is negative. I.e., the sum and the ratio are negative
because the industry and the firm performed unusually well. On average, firm performance, industry
perfonnance, and interest rate changes play no role in explaining financial distress.
In table 4. we use a second measure of the sources of fmancial distress. We calculate what interest
coverage would have been if (1) the firm's industry had performed as well as the previous year; (2) the
firm had performed as well as the industry; (3) interest rates had not changed; and (4) the firm had the
same interest expense as the median firm in the industry. We also consider a fifth factor by measuring
interest coverage using the firm's operating margins in the year before distress.
Table 4 confirms that high leverage is primarily responsible for fmancial distress in our sample.
If the sample firms had had the industry level of interest expense, they would have had a median
The methodology is not identical because they do not consider the effect of changes in short-term interest rates.
8coverage ratio of 387 not 098. The table also indicates that poor firm performance. industry
performance and interest rate changes have a negligible effect on mterest coverage ratios and, did not
lead to financial distress for the sample firms. In fact, the results show that HLT firm and HLT industry
performance helped delay the onset of financial distress. I.e., interest coverage ratios would have been
Lower if the sample finns had not outperformed their industries (median of 0.76 not 098) and if the
industries had not performed better than the previous 'tear (median of 093 not 0.98),
The fifth factor also plays a role in fmancial distress, albeitnot nearly as much as leverage.
Interest coverage would have been a median of 1.08 (not 0.98) if the firms had achieved the same
operating margins as in the year before distress. This suggests that the firms experience a decline in
margins in the year of distress (and is confirmed in table 6 below).
Our results differ substantially from those in Asquith et al. (1994) and Denis and Denis (1995).
Asquith et al. study a sample of firms that have very low operating income and find that poor firm
operating performance is the primary source of fmancial distress, explaining 56% of the cash flow
shortfall. Firm leverage explains only 21% of the cash flow shortfalls in their sample. Again, we view
this as an important advantage for our study, in that we have isolated a sample of firms for whom
leverage is the primary. if not only, source of cash flow shortfall. In that sense, our firms are largely
financially distressed, not economically distressed.
Denis and Denis (1995) find that poor industry performance, not poor finn performance is the
primary cause of fmancial distress for their leveraged recapitalizations. Our results in tables 3 and 4
indicate that leverage is the primary cause of distress with recent firm performance playing a modest
role. Poor industry performance. in contrast, plays a slightly positive role not a negative one. The
analyses we report in table 6 are closer in spirit to those in Denis and Denis, and also generate
The results are similar when we use the pre-1-ILT year not the pre-distress year (year -1) as the reference year.
9substantiath different results. The most plausible explanation for the different results, is that they study
a sample of firms with much more heterogeneous leverage levels.
4. Value calculations,
Thissection measures the change in value of the distressed HLTs from two months before the
transaction is announced until the resolution of distress. The analysis follows those in Kaplan (l989a)
and Kaplan (1994a). The date that a market value is available after the distress resolution is referred to
as the resolution valuation date. The value on the resolution date is one of four types: (I) a company's
value when it exits Chapter 11; (2) a company's value when it is sold; (3) a company's value when it
issues public equity; or (4) a company's value when it is liquidated. Sixteen of the firms in this sample
exit Chapter 11 as public companies, two are sold in the process of exiting Chapter 11, one firm is
liquidated in Chapter 11, three are sold as part of a restructuring, and eight subsequently go public after
successfully restructuring. One firm, Supermarkets General, is still private and, therefore, cannot be
valued yet. For three of the sample companies, we obtained a plan of reorganization, but were unable to
obtain a market value at resolution. In these cases, we estimated equity values using the estimated
reorganization value of the company. (The results are similar when we exclude these companies.)
For all thirty companies with resolutions, we estimate nominal, market-adjusted, and industry-
adjusted returns. We calculate and present the returns to total capital (equity, debt, preferred stock, and
capitalized leases) invested in the company two months before the HLT is announced. The market-
adjusted returns adjust the nominal returns obtained by investors by the return on the CRSP value-
weighted index over the same period. The industry-adjusted returns perform a similar adjustment, using
as a benchmark the returns on a portfolio of firms in the same Value Lme industry. The methodology is
detailed in Appendix A.
Two aspects of this methodology merit discussion. First, the market and industry adjustments
10are equivalent to assuming that the HLT assets would have performed as well as the market or the
industry if the HLTs had not occurred. Because the market and industry adjustments are applied to total
capital not equity. the market- and industry-adjusted calculations assume that the total capital of each
HLT --debtand equity --hasan assetbetaof one. This is roughly consistent with the individual betas
and the industry betas of the sample firms.
Second, the methodology calculates values using book values for debt. While this may misstate
value in some cases, it is unlikely to do so by very much. Before the HLT, most firms do not have much
long-term debt. The equity market value, which is correctly measured, is the primary value of the
company. At the time of the distress resolution, companies that emerge from Chapter 11 typically recast
their balance sheets to reflect the market value of the new debt liabilities. Companies that are sold report
sale prices for debt. The book value estimates may be inaccurate only for those companies that
restructure without Chapter 11 and, subsequently go public. Because such firms are substantially less
highly leveraged after going public, the book value estimates slightly understate true market values. In
fact, this is what we find when we use end-of-month bond prices for the public debt of these firms
(obtained from Standard & Poor's).
Table S reports that the total capital of our sample firms earn marginally more than the industry,
with a mean value of 12% and a median return of 4%. Adjusted for market returns, the sample firms
earn a mean return of 8% and a median of 5%. With standard errors of roughly 8%, none of these returns
differs significantly from O. These results, therefore, indicate that the combination of benefits from the
HLTs and costs of distress did not decrease the value of capital and, in all likelihood, increased it.
This conclusion has one immediate implication. If HLTs that defaulted earned slightly positive
market-adjusted returns, it is virtually certain that HLTs overall --thosethat defaulted and those that did
At the same time, one can statistically reject the hypothesis that these returns are more negative than -10%.
11not --earnedsignificantly positive market-adjusted returns.
Table 5 reports three other results. First, while total capital earns small market- and rndustn-
adjusted returns. the division of those returns is unequal. Post-buyout capital earns average market and
industry-adjusted returns of -23% and -9% respectively. Pre-buyout capital that sells to post-buyout
capital earns significantly positive market- and industry-adjusted returns.
Second. post-buyout equity investors in the distressed HLTs do not fare very well. Equity
investors earn nothing in eight of the HLTs and earn an average total nominal return of -7%, Adjusted
for the market and the industry, the average return is -48% and -57%, respectively. The market
adjustments overstate the returns to equity because they assume post-HLT equity betas equal one.
Third. post-buyout equity holders lose 90% or more of their investment in fourteen of the
nineteen transactions that entered Chapter 11. The violation of absolute priority for equity holders,
therefore, appears to be infrequent and small in market value terms.
5. Evidenceon the costs offinancialdistress.
This section considers quantitative and qualitative evidence on the costs of financial distress.
5.1.Quantitative estimates.
We consider quantitative measures of the costs of financial distress. First, we measure changes
in operating performance, both absolutely and relative to industry. Second, we compare the estimated
value of the firm at the time it enters distress to its value at resolution.
5.1.1Changes in operating performance.
We follow Kaplan (I 989a) and measure changes in operating performance as the percentage
change in operating margins (EBITDA to sales), capital expenditure margins, and net cash flow margins
12(EBITDA net of capital expenditures, all divided by sales). Our results are qualitatively similar when we
divide bs' assets.6 We also measure these changes relative to the industry by subtracting the changes in
median operating performance for firms in the same industry.'
Table 6 reports our results. Panel A of the table indicates that the distressed HLTs initially
register positive operating performance. Operating margins in the first full year after the HLT (post-
HLT) increase by 12.8%, nominally, and by only 1.7% adjusting for the industry. Capital expenditure
margins decline as well, although these declines were likely to have been expected at the time of the
HLT. The combination of these two changes leads to an increase in net cash flow margms of 52.9% and
industry-adjusted 54.5%. While the industry-adjusted increase in operating margins is well below the
9% found for HLTs overall by Kaplan and Stein (1993a), the 66.3% increase in net cash flow margins
compares well with the 43% they find for HLTs overall.
By the first year of distress (year 0), however, operating performance deteriorates. Compared to
pre-HLT performance, operating margins have declined by 18.2% and industry-adjusted 13.3%. Net
cash flow margins have increased, but only by 14.6% and industry-adjusted 28.1%. Similarly, panel B
shows that operating margins decline by 16.1% and industry-adjusted 17.0% from the year before
distress to the year of distress.
As noted earlier, these results differ from those in Denis and Denis (1995) who fmd that
operating income adjusted for industry performance is flat. We fmd no evidence that poor industry
perfonnance is responsible for fmancial distress, The results in year 0 (and the years after) are
qualitatively similar whether we adjust for industry performance or not.
6Weprefer to use sales as a deflator rather than assets because assets are affected both by accounting changes at the
time of the wT and by subsequent asset sales,
Our analysis does not account for changes in operating performance caused by asset sales. Because many of the
sample firms sell assets after the HLT, we are in the process of checking whether such asset sales affect the results.
13Panels B and C indicate that HLT operating and net cash flow margins continue to decline
somewhat from the first 'ear of distress until the year before distress is resolved. Immediately after the
resolution of distress, however, performance rebounds. For example, panel C indicates that operating
margins exceed their levels in the first sear of distress (year 0).
Overall, from the year before distress to the first year after resolution, panel B shows that,
operating margins decline by 7.1% and industry-adjusted 12.3%; net cash flow margins decline by 9.0%
and industry-adjusted 16.7%. From the year before the HLT to the first year after resolution, operating
margins decline by 14.9% and industiy-adjusted 12.4%; net cash flow margins increase by 29.9% and
industry-adjusted 22.0%.
Oneinterpretation of the operating results, based on the decline in operating and net cash flow
margins from the year before distress to the year after resolution, is that the net costs of financial distress
are 10% to 15%. This interpretation requires two basic assumptions. First, it assumes that the typical
firm did not experience an adverse economic shock or economic distress (worse than that suffered by the
industry), Second, the interpretation assumes that we have accurately identified the time that financial
distress begins --i.e.,the year the firm's interest coverage drops below one. We believe that the first
assumption is aggressive and that some unknown portion of the decline in margins represents adverse
economic shocks. The descriptions of each of the sample firms in Appendix B are consistent with such a
conclusion.9 In other words, we believe that 10% to 15% overstates the pure costs of financial distress.
The second assumption is less clear cut. While we believe we have identified the time that
financial distress begins, financial distress might have begun before a finn's coverage dropped below
The post-resolution results do not appear to be biased in any way by the fact that ten firms do not have post-
resolution operating results. (Nine of these ten firms were sold and one was liquidated.) The pre-resolution operating
results of those ten firms are qualitatively similar to those for the twenty-one firms with post-resolution operating results.
Again, it is important to repeat that even after these shocks, the operating margin of the typical sample firm
exceeded operating margin of its industiy.
14one. In the extreme, one might argue that financial distress for these firms began when the HLT was
completed. We think this is an unreasonable assumption because most of these firms did not consider
themselves distressed immediately after the HLT and, presumably would not have done the HLT if they
thought they would become distressed so quickly.
Nevertheless, under the assumption that fmancial distress began at the HLT, operatmg
performance from before the HLT to post-resolution becomes the relevant measure of the costs of
financial distress. The results over this period suggest that the net costs of financial distress are, if
anything, lower. Operating margins decline by roughly the same amount over this longer period
(industry-adjusted 12.4%), while net cash flow margins actually increase (industry-adjusted 22.0%).
In conclusion, the changes in operating performance suggest that the net costs of financial
distress are no greater than 10% to 15% of initial value and, likely, are smaller.
5.1.2Value at resolution versus value at distress.
Table 7 uses a value-based approach to measure the magnitude of the costs of fmancial distress.
The table compares the estimated capital value of the distressed HLTs at the end of the year before the
onset of distress --theend of year -1 or, equivalently, the beginning of year 0, the fiscal year in which
they become financially distressed --tothe capital value realized through the resolution of distress. The
capital value realized from the end of the year before the onset of distress until resolution as well as the
market and industry adjustments are calculated in the same way as the returns from pre-HLT to
resolution in section 4.
Because most of the securities of the sample firms were not publicly-traded at the onset of
distress, we must estimate capital value at the end of the fiscal year before the HLT becomes distressed.
We follow Kaplan and Ruback (1995) and estimate capital value as the sum of (1) cash on hand; and (2)
the product of the median industry multiple of total capital to EBITDA that year and the HLT's
15EBITDA. Kaplan and Ruback (1995) find that this methodology is successful in explaining a large
fraction of the variation in actual HLT transaction values but underestimates the transaction values by
17%. We. nevertheless, rely on this methodology because the HLT's in their sample forecast that
operating margins would increase by roughly the same 17% in the first year after the HLT. In other
words, applying this methodology to EBITDA in the first post-HLT year yields estimated values that are
(statistically) indistinguishable from the transaction values.'°
The value-based results in table 7 are consistent with the operating performance results in table
6. Using the year before the onset of financial distress, the median estimates imply that the costs of
financial distress are 20.7% adjusted for the industry and 24.7% adjusted for the market. The average
estimated costs of financial distress, however, are smaller, at 9.7% and 9.8%, respectively, adjusted for
the industry and the market. Neither of the average values differs significantly from 0. As noted in the
previous paragraph, we think it is likely that these estimates overstate the net costs of financial distress
because thes may include the effects of some adverse economic shock.
Table 5providesanother estimate of the net costs of financial distress. As we noted in the
analysis of operating performance, one might make the extreme assumption that financial distress began
imnediately after the HLT was completed. Under this assumption, the losses to post-HLT capital would
approximate the costs of financial distress. In table 5, we estimate the average losses to post-HLT
capital as 23% industry-adjusted and 26% market-adjusted. Again, we believe that these estimates also
overstate the true costs of financial distress for this sample.
There is an additional reason we think that both sets of estimates --fromthe year before distress
and from the HLT --mayoverstate the costs of financial distress. For the twenty sample firms with
Using estimated capital value at the end of the year before the onset of distress may overstate the value of the
I-lETs when they become distressed because the estimates use EBITDA in the year before distress. As table 6 indicates,
these firms experience a decline in operating margins from the pre-distress year to the year of distress. To the extent
that the decline and distress are precipitated by an adverse economic shock, our estimated capital value will not he
adjusted for the shock. For this reason, we believe the results here will overstate the costs of financial distress,
16available post-resolution stock returns, we calculated industry- and market-adjusted stock returns from
post-resolution through December 1995. We find that the equities of these firms earn average
cumulative market-adjusted returns of 267% and industry-adjusted returns of 77.9%. In other words, the
sample firms do unexpectedly well after emerging from Chapter 11 or restructuring. Our results are
consistent with recent work by Eberhart. Aggarwal, and Altman (1997) and Alderson and Betker (1996)
who study larger samples of firms that emerge from Chapter 11.
Overall, then, our value-based estimates indicate that the average net costs of financial distress
are 10% of initial value, Our upper-bound estimates imply average net costs of roughly 25%. And, there
are good reasons to believe that these estimates overstate the pure net costs of fmancial distress.
5.2.Qualitativeestimates: Operating changes afier distress and Chapter 11.
In this section, we augment the quantitative estimates of the costs of fmancial distress with
qualitative evidence of such costs. The qualitative costs include evidence of (1) irrevocable and costly
reductions in capital expenditures; (2) asset sales at depressed prices; (3) undesired losses of key
customers; (4) undesired losses of suppliers; (5) asset substitution; and (6) delay. Of course, as noted in
Kaplan (1 994a and I 994b) and Wruck (1990), fmancial distress also can provide benefits. Such benefits
include (1) the removal of poor management; (2) operating improvements; and (3) the sale or
discontinuation of poorly performing assets.
We obtain this qualitative evidence from press reports, annual reports, lOKs, and plans of
reorganization (PORs), paying special attention to management's discussion of operations and liquidity
in the latter three types of documents,
Table 8 summarizes our qualitative analysis of financial distress. We find evidence of costly
investment cuts, depressed asset sales, and delay which are detailed in tables 9A -9C.Appendix B
describes the onset and outcome of distress for each company.
17Table 9A indicates that all thirty-one firms in our sample curtail capital expenditures at some
point. At least some of the cuts appear to be undesiraNe and potentially costly for seventeen of the
firms.
Table 9B reports that ten firms appear to sell assets at depressed prices while nine firms may
have done so. Twelve firms do not appear to sell assets at depressed prices.
Table 9C shows that fourteen firms took actions to delay the resolution of the financial distress.
The delay appears to have been costly for at least nine of these firms.
We also considered whether the sample firms engage in risk shifting or asset substitution. In
particular, we looked for instances in which the distressed firms made large investments in unusually
risk-v capital expenditures, projects, or acquisitions. We found no evidence of such behavior in any of
the sample firms. Debt covenants undoubtedly play a large role in this result.
Finally, table 8 reports that ten firms experienced difficulties with suppliers, eight firms
difficulties with customers, and nine firms appear to have been hurt competitively while they were
distressed.
On the benefit side, twenty-three of the financially distressed firms clearly make greater efforts
to cut costs and attempt to improve operations after becoming distressed. Fifteen firms bring on a new
chairman, president or CEO during the period of distress.
The analysis in table 8 also reports when the costs and benefits of financial distress are incurred.
To the extent they occur, the costs are heavily concentrated in the penod after the firms become
distressed, but before they enter Chapter 11 There is little qualitative evidence that Chapter 11 is
inefficient or even costly for our sample firms. Under the safe harbor from debt payments provided by
Chapter 11, the sample firms resolve difficulties with suppliers, customers, and competitiveness in
general. In a vety different study, Gilson (1997) reaches a similar conclusion.
This qualitative analysis uncovers costs and benefits of financial distress. The contribution here
18is to describethe frequencyof different types of costs and benefits and when those costs and benefits
appear to be incurred. This also should be interesting for readers who take a cynical view of the
relevance of management discussions of operations in SEC filings, particularly those who believe that
managers never willingly report bad news.
6 Cross-sectional analysis.
In this section we consider the cross-sectional determinants, of the costs of fmancial distress.
We measure the costs of fmancial distress using the value-based quantitative estimates of the costs of
financial distress from section 5.1.2 adjusted for industry performance. While this measure may not
measure the costs of financial distress perfectly, we are not aware of ans' reason to believe it is biased in
any particular way. Accordingly, the estimated coefficients in the regressions that follow should be
unbiased. We acknowledge, however, that we may obtain insirificant results because the data are
noisy, not because the relationships do not exist.
61 Costs ofJinancial distress and capital structure complexity.
We first test whether costs of financial distress are related to the complexity of the HLT's capital
structure. As a firm's capital structure has more securities and becomes more complex, conflicts of
interest and free rider problems increase. Complexity makes it more difficult for claimants to agree on
the division of the firms assets, and, therefore, prolongs both the amount of time a firm experiences
financial distress and the costs of that distress. See Gertner and Scharfstein (1991), Giammarino (1989),
Haugen and Senbet (1995), and Wruck (1990). We measure complexity using the log of the number of
securities in the HLT capital structure. (We use a log specification because it seems unlikely that costs
increase linearly. The results, however, are similar using linear or dummy variable specifications.)
Regression (I) indicates that costs of fmancial distress decline with capital structure complexity.
19(significant at the 5°A level). This is not consistent with increased complexiw increasing the costs of
financial distress.
6.2Costs of financial distress and ease of restructuring
We also consider the effect of three other variables that, in theory. affect a firm's ability to
reorganize or restructure. First, we include a dummy variable for the presence of public junk bonds.
Because the Trust Indenture Act makes it difficult to restructure public debt, it is possible that the
presence of public junk bonds will increase the costs of fmancial distress. In addition, Kaplan and Stein
(1993) fmd that MBOs that use junk bonds are subsequently more likely to default. They argue that this
potentially indicates that the junk bond market overheated if the costs of financial distress are
particularly large in such transactions. Regression (2) finds that the use ofjunk bonds is associated with
lower costs of financial distress although the coefficient is not significant. This is not supportive junk
bonds being more difficult to restructure nor is it supporting of overheating.
Second, we include a variable that measures the fraction of debt which is bank debt in the year
before the HLT becomes distressed. Gilson, John and Lang (1990) fmd that firms are more likely to
resolve financial distress through private workouts the more heavily those firms rely on bank debt.
Consistent with the GiLson. John. and Lang result, regression (3) indicates that a greater fraction of bank
debt reduces the net costs of fmancial distress (significant at the 10% level). This suggests that the
presence of bank debt improves a firm's ability to renegotiate or restructure.
Third, we include a dummy variable for the presence of a buyout sponsor, The presence of a
buyout sponsor might be expected to reduce the costs of financial distress because they may develop
expertise in restructuring and because most buyout sponsors will want to protect their reputations in
order to do future HLT transactions. Regression (4) indicates that the presence of a buyout sponsor has
no effect on the costs of financial distress.
206.3 Costs oJfznancial distress and total value.
Wenext test whether costs of financial distress are related to the capital value of the HLT at the
time of the HLT. The costs will be negatively related to total capital value if there are important fixed
costs to restructuring --forexample, legal costs, creditor costs to get information on the distressed firm.
etc. Alternatively, to the extent that complexity increases the costs of financial distress and that capital
value is a measure of complexity, costs of financial distress will increase with capital value.
Regression (5) indicates that the costs of financial distress decrease with (the log of) HLT capital
value. This result is consistent with fixed costs of fmancial distress and, again, not consistent with
increased complexity increasing the costs of fmancial distress.
Because HLT capital value and capital structure complexity are highly correlated, regression (6)
includes both variables in one regression. Wh.ile neither of the coefficients is significant. costs of
distress decrease with HLT capital value and with capital structure complexity. Again, this result is more
consistent with fixed costs of distress and less consistent with complexity increasing the costs of
financial distress.
6.4 Costs ofJmnancialdistress and time indistress.
Itis commonly argued [e.g., see Helwege (1996) and Jensen (1989 and 1991)] thatthe costs of
financial distress increase with the time in financial distress, in default, and Chapter 11. The costs
increase with time because the value of the firms is assumed to dissipate as claimants expend resources
arguing over the division of the value of the company. Alternatively, Haugen and Senbet (1978) argue
that claimants' bargaining may not affect overall firm value.
We empirically estimate the relation between our measures of the costs of distress and the time
each firm was financially distressed. We also distinguish between firms that defaulted and those that did
21not for two reasons: (1) firms that default are more likely to have experienced a negative operating shock
which will decrease the return to HLT capital and increase the measured costs of financial distress; and
(2) financial distress is arguably more severe for firms that defaulted. Before reporting the results, it is
worth noting that this regression specification is potentially flawed. It is quite possible that the time in
distress is endogenous, with a longer time in distress indicating that the firm is in greater financial and
operating difficulty.
Regression (7) indicates that there is no relation between the time in distress and the costs of
financial distress. This result is insensitive to different definitions of time in distress. The result in
regression (7). like the earlier regressions are consistent with the bargaining surrounding claims in
distress having no effect on the value of the underlying firm.
65Costs offinancial distress and industry performan cc.
Shleifer and Vishny (1992) predict that fmancial distress will be more costly when the distressed
firms industn' performs badly because the distressed finn's assets will be relatively illiquid --thebuyers
who value the distressed firm's assets the most highly will fmd it difficult to buy those assets.
We test this prediction by comparing our measures of industry-adjusted costs of financial
distress against different quartiles of industry perfonnance. According to Shleifer and Vishny, costs of
financial distress higher when industries perform relatively poorly. We measure industry performance as
the equal-weighted return to finns in the same industry over the period that costs of fmancial distress are
calculated. In regression (8), we fmd no relation between industry performance and either the return to
pre-HLT capital or the costs of fmancial distress. The results are similar when we measure industry
performance relative to the overall stock market.
226.6Quantitative costs a/financial distress and qualitative costs offinancial distress.
We also considered the relationship between our qualitative and quantitative measures of
Imancial distress. We do not report these in a table. Because the qualitative variables are imprecise
measures of the extent of the costs of distress, we did not expect much from these regressions and we did
not get much, All of the coefficients are insignificant.
7. Summary, implications and generality of results.
7.1 Summary
This paper studies a sample of highly leveraged transactions (HLTs) that subsequently become
fmanciallv distressed. First, we estimate the effects of f'mancial distress on value. From pre-transaction
to distress resolution, the sample firms experience a small increase in value. In other words, the net
effect of the HLT and distress is to leave value slightly higher. This strongly suggests that HLTs overall
--thosethat defaulted and those that did not --earnedsignificantly positive market-adjusted returns.
Second, we estimate the costs of fmancial distress and their determinants. The sample firms
have positive operating margins at the time of distress that typically exceed the median industry
operating margins. Because of this. we believe that this sample is primarily fmancially distressed, not
economically distressed. Accordingly, our estimates of the costs of distress largely represent costs of
pure financial distress. Because we cannot eliminate economic distress or shocks completely, our
estimates should be considered upper bounds on the costs of pure financial distress for these firms.
Consistent with some costs of distress, several firms are forced to curtail capital expenditures
and a number of firms appear to sell assets at depressed prices. We find no evidence that the distressed
firms engage in asset substitution of any kind.
To the extent they do occur, the costs of distress are heavily concentrated in the period after the
firms become distressed, but before they enter Chapter 11. We find little evidence that Chapter 11 is
23inefficient or costly for our sample firms. This result is in agreement with recent work by Alderson and
Betker (1995). Gertner and Picker (1992), Gilson (1997), and Maksimovic and Phillips (996). The result
also suggests that the experience of Eastern Airlines, documented in Weiss and Wruck (1996) may be
more the exception than the rule.
We provide several estimates of the magnitude of the net costs of financial distress. Our most
likely estimates of these costs average less than 10% of firm value. Our most conservative estimates do
not exceed 25% of firm value. These net costs are substantially lower than those found in previous
studies of firms that are economically distressed. For example, Altman (1984) fmds that cumulative
earnings shortfalls in the three years before bankruptcy approximate 25% of initial stock value. Altman
does not attempt to capitalize these earnings shortfalls. if he had, they would undoubtedly have been
much greater than 25%,
Finally, we estimate the cross-sectional determinants of the costs of financial distress. We fmd
that these costs decline with HLT value and the fraction of total debt owed to banks, but are not related to
capital structure complexity, the presence ofjunk bonds, the presence of buyout sponsors, time in
distress, or industry performance. These results are not consistent with increased complexity increasing
the costs of fmancial distress, They also suggest that costs of fmancial distress have a fixed component.
7.2 Implications
Our estimates of the net costs of fmancial distress have potentially important implications for
capital structure choice. Compared to estimates of the direct costs of financial distress on the order of
3% of firm value (Weiss [1990]), our estimates of the costs of fmancial distress--an average of 10%
with an upper bound of 25% --mightappear high (although they are lower than those in previous
studies). This would be particularly true if there is a selection bias in which firms with low costs of
financial distress are more likely to become highly leveraged.
24Alternatively, from an ex ante framework that trades off expected costs of financial distress
against the tax and incentive benefits of debt, these costs of financial distress seem low. If the costs of
financial distress are 10% (or even 25%). then the expected costs of financial distress for most public
companies are modest if not minimal because the probability of financial distress is very small for most
public companies. As long as debt conveys tax benefits, a standard capital structure choice analysis,
trading off tax and incentive benefits of debt against the expected costs of financial distress, would
conclude that the sample firms and firms like them should have a highly leveraged capital structure,
While we acknowledge the alternative interpretation, we believe this low cost of financial distress
interpretation is more persuasive.
The final issue that we address is the extent to which our results generalize to mature firms. It is
possible that the finns that undertook HLTs were those which, ex ante, expected to have low costs of
financial distress. If this is true, our estimates of the costs of financial distress understate the costs of
financial distress for firms in general.
Several papers find that HLT firms do not have high research and development expenditures
(R&D). Kaplan (I 989a) and Hall (1990) note that HLT finns tended to be in mature industries that did
not require large amount of R&D. Opler and Titman (1993) study firms that undertook LBOs in the
1980s. Over the 1985 to 1990 period that is relevant for our sample firms, they fmd that firms with
higher R&D expenditures were less likely to undertake LBOs. Other than differences in R&D, however,
they find little evidence that firms with low costs of financial distress were more likely to undertake
LBOs)1 A reasonable interpretation of these results is that among companies that are not R&D
intensive, HLT companies are not selected in an obvious way for low costs of financial distress. Among
In our sample, we compared the costs of financial distress for I-ILls that were motivated by hostile pressure with
those that were not. If 1-ILTs are specially selected, we would expect those motivated by hostile pressure to be less
selected and to have higher costs of financial distress. We do not find this. In our sample, the hostile HLTs have
insignificantly lower costs of financial distress.
25such companies, therefore, our results are likely to generalize.
The results in Maksimovic and Phillips (1996) also suggest that our results are general. The use
plant-level data to examine the productivity and plant-closure decisions of bankrupt firms. They find
little evidence of bankruptcy costs, particularly in industries that are not high growth.
There also is little evidence that HLTs were concentrated in industries with less volatile cash
flows or, equivalently, low probabilities of financial distress. Kaplan and Stem (1993a) and Bemanke et
al. (1990) find that the HLTs of the later I 980s (which we study here) operated in industries whose cash
flows were approximately as volatile as the average industrial firm on COMPUSTAT. We performed a
similar test and found that the HLTs in our sample did not operate in Value Line industries with
operating margins that were less volatile than average. These fmdings suggest that the probability of
financial distress was not particularly low for the sample HLTs.
Overall, then, we cannot conclude that our results would hold for firms in high R&D or,
possibly, high growth businesses. (In fact, we believe the results are unlikely to hold for such firms.)
However, among firms in more mature businesses, it seems likely that the results for our sample HLTs
would hold.
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29Appendix A:
Methodfor Calculating Excess Returns to Investors
Thisappendix describes the method used to calculate excess returns to HLT investors.
In this analysis, time is measured as follows:
TI T2 T3 T4
Two Months HLT HLT Exit Chapter 11 or
Before HLT Announcement Completed Company Sold or IPO or
Announcement
. DistressResolved
The total capital value of the HLT company at time T equals the sum of the values of equity,
long-term debt, short-term debt, and capitalized leases when the HLT is completed:
TCAPT =
MarketValue of Equity1 +
BookValue of Long-term and Short-term Debt1 +
BookValue of Capitalized Leases1.
The total return to investors is calculated as:
[TCAP14 +InterimPayments to Capital -TCAPJ1]
NRET=
TCAP11
Interim payments to capital include the annual principal, interest, dividend and lease payments
made between Tl and T4. It is assumed that the interim payments are invested in a portfolio with the
same systematic risk as the company as a whole. This adjustment will tend to underestimate the terminal
value because such payments are made throughout the year, rather than at year-end.
The excess return earned by investors in the HLT is estimated as the difference between the total
HLT return and the return on an investment of the same systematic risk over the same period:
MXRET (11 +NRET]/[l +Roverthesameperiod])- 1,
30where R is the CRSP return on the value-weighted NYSE-AMEX index.
Industry-adjusted returns are calculated in the same way as market-adjusted returns except that
the industzy benchmark return is the return on an equal-weighted portfolio of firms in the same Value
Line industry.
IXRET =
([1+NRETJI[1+Rmo overthe same period-
where Rmd is the return on the equal-weighted industry portfolio.
Both the market-adjusted and industry-adjusted methods are likely to understate the true returns
earned bytheHLTs because both methods assume that all of the HLT assets --bothdebt and equity --
wouldhave earned equity-like returns over the sample period.
31Appendix B:
Individual Company DescriptionsofFinancial Distress
American Standard
In7/88, a group of investors lead by Kelso acquired American Standard CAST"), one of the largest manufacturers
of plumbing products. air conditioning systems and braking systems worldwide. Kelso came in as a white knight, as
AST was the target of a hostile bid from Black & Decker ("B&D"). The deal, partly financed by AST's ESOP, was
viewed largely as a means for managers to entrench themselves, particularly after Kelso paid $2SMM to B&D to
"go away". At the time analysts commented that the bidding had gone well beyond any reasonable estimates of
value. Still, during the first two years, operating results were strong, and the Company was able to complete a flurry
of asset sales, despite weakness in the economy. There was no indication that the prices obtained were unfair.
However, by 1991 the soft US construction market caught up with AST, as cash flows from operations began to
decline. Also, at this point capital expenditures had dropped significantly relative to pre-I-ILT levels, although again
the consequences were not clear, since the Company had just completed a major overhaul of all operations before
the buyout. In 1991, AST had to obtain a series of covenant waivers from its banks, as the Company was in danger
of violating them, which would have constituted default. Also, the Company sold its railway braking business,
previously part of its core operations. As a result, during 1992 and 1993 the Company underwent a series of new
debt issues and exchanges, the purpose of which was to repay expensive bank debt and extend maturities, as well as
avoid cash interest payments on certain subordinated issues, which were to start in 1993. This first recap was also
supposed to include an IPO, which was scrapped because the price was not considered "satisfactory" by
management. Finally in 1994, with US and European markets fully recovered and AST reporting strong cash flows,
the Company underwent its second recap, which included a new credit facility and an IPO, which was very well
received. Relative to the pre-I-ILT year, by time it went public AST's EBITDA / Sales had decreased 20%, while
Cap. Expenditures / Sales also fell 63%, leading to an overall increase in Net Cash Flow / Sales of 39%.
BucyrusErie
In2/88, Bucyrus Erie ("BE"). a leadmg designer, manufacturer, and marketer of surface mining machinery,
completed an MBO. As earl)' as 1985, BE had hired CS First Boston to explore alternatives, as its core mining
segment was in severe decline, and eventually decided to put itself up for sale. The Company received several bids
before the MBO was completed, but it appeared that management refused to consider them. Most of the MBO was
financed with cash from the sale of an Aerospace division. Analysts were concerned that BE would have no more
assets to sell in case of bad performance. Initially, all appeared well, and the Company even made some
acquisitions in 1988 and 1989. In 1991, interest rates turned unfavorable, and the resulting higher interest payments
forced BE to look for new ways to control costs and improve cash flow. By that point, negative cash flows and net
losses since the KIBO. along with the increased interest expense led the Company to seek a refinancing or
restructuring of existing debt and the raising of new equity capital. In 1992 BE engaged in a sale and leaseback
fmancing arrangement of its last remaining manufacturer facility. At that point, S&P remarked that the Company
maintained a strong market position, however its excessive debt burden combined with volatile demand made it
unlikely the firm would ever meet its obligations and turn a profit. By 1993, BE announced a financial
restructuring, as part of which the Company would refrain from making interest payments. The restructuring was
planned as part of a prepackaged Chapter 11, but was delayed after a major debt holder filled a suit against the
Company and Goldman Sachs, an original partner in the MBO. In 2/94, a voluntary Chapter II petition was filed
and, eventually, the suit was settled out of court and an amended plan was accepted in 12/94. Relative to the last
year before its recapitalization, by the time it emerges from Ch. 11, Bucyrus Erie's EBITDA / Sales had improved
39%, while Cap. Exp. / Sales had dropped by 70%, with an overall increase in Net Cash Flow to Sales of 400%
(220%. -30% and 440% industry-adjusted, respectively).
BurlingtonIndustries
In9/87, Burlington Industries ("BI"), one of the world's largest textile companies, was acquired in a 1-ILT by a
group led by Morgan Stanley and incumbent managers. The deal was the final tactic employed by the Company to
32tight off a hostile takeover attempt, after legal remedies and a proposed recapitalization had failed. As part of the
restructuring BI announced it would sell assets, reduce overhead and curtail CAPX. In 1987 and 1988, BI made a
flurn' of asset sales of businesses considered unessential. Atthe time, the Company's CAPX was severely limited
by its credit agreement, hut BI did not view this as a problem, since they had just completed a decade long
modernization program. In 1989, BI underwent a reorganization, as part of which it raised equity from a newly
formed ESOP and paid old equity holders a large dividend. Later, in 1990, the Company transferred control to the
ESOP in a complicated transaction where the MBO investors exchanged their common equity for new preferred
stock. At the same time, BI announced a restructuring of certain divisions, includmg lay-offs, closing down facilities
and asset dispositions. Still, despite all these measures, in 1991, after an unsuccessful attempt to buy back and retire
a large portion of its junk bonds at deep discount, the Company told bondholders it might be forced to file for
bankruptcy. Shortly thereafter, BI fonnulated a restructuring plan that mcluded a smaller bond buyhack attempt, the
sale of its core Masland subsidiary and an exchange of bonds. This program was completed in 11/91. Finally, in
1992, due to favorable interest rates and market receptivity, B! completed an IPO along with a mass retiring of high-
yield debt. As of the time it went public, BUs EBITDAJSa1es had improved 39% (24% industiy-adiusted) relative
to the pre-l-ILT year, and with the reduction in capital expenditures, Net Cash Flow / Sales grew an impressive 88%
(67% industry-adjusted) over the same time period.
CherokeeGroup
In10/88, Cherokee Group ('Cherokee"), a manufacturer and importer of women's and men's apparel and shoes,
accepted a tender otter representing the first stage of a MBO, which was completed in 5/89. The Company founder
rejected the deal, hut was eventually out-voted and lost the Company to his second in command. During 1990
Cherokee restructured its Menswear Division, substantially reducing overhead, then in 6/90 attempted an IPO that
was eventually scrapped because of low demand for new public offerings since the beginning of the Gulf War. In
6/91, however, a successful IIPO was completed and the proceeds used to pay down debt. Despite the IPO, 1991 and
1992 proved to be poor years for Cherokee, with sales plummeting due to a difficult economy in California, where a
majority of the Company's stores were located. In 4/92, Cherokee tried to sell new senior subordinated debt to
retire old, higher interest debt, but could not complete the offering at an acceptable interest rate. Through the end of
1992, economic conditions did not improve, and retail customers and suppliers voiced uncertainty about Cherokee's
ability to restructure its debt, and consequently cut back on their dealings with the Company. On 11/92 Cherokee
failed to make an interest payment on its debt, after which they began negotiations with creditors. This resulted in
the adoption of a reorganization plan, mostly a debt for equity swap, that would occur in a pre-packaged
bankruptcy. Cherokee emerged from Ch. 11 in 6/93. Relative to its last pre-MBO fiscal year, by the time Cherokee
reorganized, EBITDA / Sales and Net Cash Flow / Sales had fallen 80% (89% industiy-adjusted for both).
FloridaSteel
In11/88, a management-led team completed an MBO of Flonda Steel ("FS"), a manufacturer of steel and steel
products with a primary presence in the Southeastern, mid-Atlantic and Midwestern US. Analysts commented that
FS was a good MBO candidate, because plants were relatively modern, allowing CAPX to be postponed or cut in
the short-run. In 1989, the Company announced that it would rebuild and modernize some facilities in preparation
for expansion into new markets in Florida. In 1990, however, operating income plummeted as FS was hit with a
severe downward trend in average selling prices, due to an excess supply caused by slowing residential and
commercial construction. 1991 proved no better and, as the result of continued dropping prices and demand, the
Company implemented cost saving measures, including wage freezes and reductions, and the offering of early
retirement to select employees. These measures were not enough, however, and later in 1991, the Company was in
violation of covenants under its bank debt agreements. The Company conceded its outlook was bleak in the short-
term, as the depression of selling prices was not expected to improve until the general economy improved. As a
result, in 5/92 FS did not have sufficient cash flow to pay interest on debentures, and was forced to explore
alternatives, including a sale. FS agreed to be acquired by Kyoei Steel in 6/92, effectively bailing themselves out.
The deal was viewed as an excellent move for FS, since Kyoei was a respected company, the price was fair, and
they promised to leave FS as an independent unit. The merger was completed in 12/92. Relative to the last year
before its MBO. by 1992 Florida Steel's EBITDA / Sales had dropped 53%, and despite the decrease in capital
33expenditures. Net Cash Flow ISaleshad also fallen by 43% (67% and 59% industry-adjusted, respectively).
Fort Howard
In 10/88, Fort Howard ("FH") was acquired by a group of investors lead by Morgan Stanley and incumbent
managers. The Company was a major producer of disposable tissue paper and plastic ("cup") products. In the first
several years, the business operated as usual. The Company announced it would continue its existing modernization
and capacity expansion prolects. FH also decided to divest its entire cup operations, selling it off to a group lead liv
Morgan Stanley as well. The deal was considered sound, as the tissue and cup businesses had never blended well.
Also, there was no indication that the price was unfair. Through 1990, cash flows from operations were quite strong,
as the Company continued to invest in new capacity in the US and UK. In 1991, with industry over capacity and
stiff price competition, revenues and operating margins plunged. At the same time, PH sought a $1 60MM equity
iniection from its main investors, followed by new debt issuances, proceeds of which were used to retire existing
debt. In 1992, due to continued market weakness, the Company was forced to pull its planned debt and common
stock issues. In 1993, Fl-I wrote off all remaining goodwill ($2 billion), anindication that management perceived
that value had been impaired. This was followed by a second set of debt issuance and retirements meant to give the
Company some breathing room. Still, at the beginning of 1994 FH announced that in the absence of sigmficantlv
improved results, and in light of upcoming cash interest initiations on sub. debt, the Company would soon have to
seek covenant waivers and maturity extensions. By mid-1994 however, results started to improve, and following its
first post-liLT positive earnings quarter, PH announced an IPO, which was executed in early 1995. Note that
throughout its distress period, FH continued to invest in facility upgrades and new paper machines, and analysts
agreed there was no indication that the Company's investment program or competitiveness in the market had
suflèred. Compared to the Pre-FILT year, EBITDA / Sales grew 15% and Capital Exp. / Sales dropped 38%,
leading to a 54% overall increase in Net Cash Flow ISalesby 1994.
Fruehauf
In12/86, a team of investors lead by members of management and Merrill Lynch completed a MBO of Fmehauf in
response to a hostile takeover offer from a group lead by New York investor A. Edelman. In the offer, existing
shareholders received a package of cash and new shares of Preferred and Series B common stock, giving them a
50% equity stake in the remaining entity, with the rest controlled by the new investors, Upon completion, the
investors announced plans for major asset sales to repay debt and focus the Company's operations exclusively in its
core trailer and auto parts businesses. By late 1987 Fruehauf was already in violation of certain debt covenants. In
1988, results from trailer business were significantly below pre-MBO projections and Company was not generating
enough cash to service debts. Meanwhile, banks were unwilling to extend new financing and Fruehauf's existing
lines of credit were expiring unrenewed. As a result, Company was forced to restructure trailer business: remove
management layers, sell or restructure sales branches, close down plants. In addition, capital expenditures were cut
and under pertbnning maritime business was sold. These measures however did not suffice, and, in 6/89,
management was forced to divest the automotive business and eventually sell the remaining assets to Vanty Corp. at
a price considered by analysts at the time to be a "great deal" for the buyer. The sale closed on 12/89. Relative to
the last year before IvIBO, by 1989 Fruehauf's EBITDA / Sales had fallen 19% (29% industry-adjusted) and Capital
Expenditures / Sales had fallen 31% (35% industry-adjusted).
HarcourtBrace Jovanovich
In7/87, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich ("l-J"), one of the world's largest publishers, with interests in amusement
parks and insurance as well, completed a leveraged recapitalization m reaction to a hostile takeover offer by British
investor Robert Maxwell. During the first post-HLT year, results were positive: revenues were up, operating costs
down and asset sales ahead of schedule. In 12/88 CEO Jovanovich suddenly retired and rumors circulated that firm
was having difficulty meeting debt obligations and was under pressure from banks to sell core assets. In 1989 I-IBJ
announced the sale of its Parks division (Sea World) to Anheuser-Busch for $1.1 billion, significantly below $1.5
billion expected. Analysts commented Parks had lost many customers due to reduced investments in marketing and
park maintenance, to generate cash for debt payments. Results from Publishing division took a dive as Company's
elementary and secondary school offerings were dropped by many school districts, apparently due to lack of
34investment in keeping products up-to-date. Publishing also suffered top management defections. As a result, 1-.l
restructured Publishing, invested in new products and marketing, and cut payroll. By 1990, results from operations
had improved significantly, however T-IBJ stated the leverage-induced uncertainty was still causing significant
difficulties: unfavorable credit terms from suppliers, difficulty hiring and retaining managers and authors, inability
to renew credit facilities. By late 1990, HBJ announced its future cash flows would not suffice to meet all debt
obligations without some restructuring or sale of the Company. As a result, m early 1991 HBJ agreed to be bought
by General Cinema. The sale was completed in 12/91.Relativeto the last year before its recapitalization, by 991
I-IBJ's EBITDA / Sales had increased 10% (19% industry-adjusted) and Capital Expenditures / Sales had fallen 68%
(42% industry-adiusted).
Hanard Industries
In 11/88, William 1-lurley. who already controlled 45% of Harvard Industries ("Harvard"), a manufacturer of auto
parts supplying the OEM market, took the Company private by acquiring the remaining 55%ina tender offer
approved by the Board. The Company stated it did not expect any asset sales. or reductions in investments in order
to meet its increased debt obligations. In fact, dunng 1989, capital exp. increased and the Company contmued its
strategy of growth by acquisitions. By 1990, however, as the auto industry went into a severe recession, client
orders plummeted and the Company was unable to generate cash flows to service debt and comply with major debt
covenants. As a result, Harvard sold Anchor Swan hose products business and restructured its remaining
operations, by cutting salaries, tightening inventory controls and laying off workers. However, cash flow
improvements were not quick enough, and in 11/90 Harvard defaulted on its debt. Unable to obtain an out-of-court
restructuring with creditors, the Company filed for Chapter 11 in 4/91. During its distress period, Harvard reduced
its capital expenditures, but more importantly, investments were focused on developing three new major product
lines. As a result olthese investments, as well as the pre-bankruptcy restructuring, the Company was able to
quickly turn its operating results around, and emerged from Chapter 11 in 8/92 in much better operating condition.
Compared to the last year before the buyout, by the time Harvard emerged from Ch. 11 its EBITDA / Sales had
fallen 4.8% (although a 9% increase industry-adjusted) and Capital Expenditures / Sales had fallen 21% (8%
industry-adjusted), leading to flat Net Cash Flow! Sales (11% increase industry-adjusted).
Hills Stores
In 12/85, Hills Stores ("Hills"), a regional discount retailer, agreed to a buyout led by management and Drexel
Burnham Larnbert. Through 1988, Hills aggressively expanded, opening 10-15 new stores each year, which it
intended to continue into the foreseeable future. Also during 1987, the Company went public in an IPO. In 1989,
Hills opened 42 more new stores, including taking over 33 former Gold Circle outlets, making the Company the
dominant retail force in Ohio and upstate New York. Expansion plans were curbed in 1990, as a sluggish apparel
market and the costs associated with opening the former Gold Circle stores eroded profit. Toward the end of 1990,
the continued weakening of the apparel economy and disappointing sales from the newly-acquired stores resulted in
a deterioration in liquidity, and in 1/91 Hills closed 28 out of its 214 stores and started working toward a
restructuring plan. At the time, a Chapter 11 filing was vehemently demed but, a few weeks later. Hills failed to
make a scheduled interest payment and stopped paying its suppliers for merchandise. Negotiations with the hank
group proved unsuccessful and some merchandisers stopped shipping to the stores. As a result, in 2/91 Hills filed
for Chapter II. DIP fmancing was immediately obtained; the Company quickly closed 60 stores, shed its top
management, and embarked on a remodeling process that was basically complete by its emergence from Chapter II
in 10/93. Relative to its last pre-I-ILT fiscal year, 1993 EBITDA / Sales increased 6% (a 27% drop industry-
adjusted), however with the increase in capital investments during Ch. 11, Net Cash Flow / Sales declined by 4%
(33% industry-adjusted).
I nte ito
In 12/88, Interco, a furniture (Broyhill and Lane) and footwear (Plorsheim and Converse) manufacturer, completed
a three-step recapitalization aimed at rebuffing a hostile takeover bid by the Rales brothers. The recap included
plans to divest all non-core operations, as well as Ethan Allen and Senack Shoes. Two months after completion,
Interco was already in violation of some of its debt covenants, and the Company subsequently accepted a lower bid
35for its Londontown business because bidder could pay sooner, demonstrating its tight cash position. During 1989, a
combination of disappointing sales in core segments and weaker than projected proceeds from asset sales lead
Interco to announce it would not be able to generate enough cash to satisfr debt obligations. CEO Saligman
resigned and the new Chief Executive instituted a complete restructuring at Converse and Florsheim, slashed capital
expenditures and increased advertising. Interco also began negotiations for a debt restructuring, and during 1990
various reorganization plans were proposed by management, while the Company stayed afloat by obtaining waivers
from bankers extending principal and interest payments. However, sales in shoes and furniture worsened, making
an out-of-court restructuring not viable. Interco filed for Chapter 11 in 1/91. Dunng Ch. I, as a result of pre-filing
restructurings, operating margins improved and capital expenditures also increased, helping Interco emerge from
bankruptcy in 8/92. Relative to the last year before its recapitalization, by the time it emerged from Ch. 11,
Interco's EBITDA / Sales had decreased 54% (43% industry-adjusted) and Capital Exp. ISaleshad fallen 27%
(16% increase industry-adjusted).
Km
In12/88,KDI, adiversified manufacturer of swimming pools and electronic components, completed a management
led huyout. The deal was controversial from the beginningbecauseof the speed with which the Company accepted
the offer, apparently without giving due consideration to others. The deal included plans to sell many of the
Company'soperating divisions. In 1989, KDI started to implement its planned divestitures, but due to poor
conditions in the acquisitions market, the Company had difficulties completing all its dispositions. In addition, there
were indications that the sales it did complete may have been at discount pnces because of the need to sell quickly.
In 1990, the divestiture program still had not been completed and both KDI's core industry segments were in
decline, resulting in a cash flow shorifall and missed interest payments, forcing the Company into negotiations with
its creditors. In 6/91, negotiations resulted in a comprehensive restructuring, including a new bank credit agreement
and a debt for equity swap with senior bond holders. Relative to the pre-HLT year, EBJTDA / Sales fell 77% while
Net Cash Flow! Sales dropped 89% (78% and 90% industry-adjusted, respectively).
Leaseway Transportation
In 6/87, Leaseway Transportation ("LT"), a trucking and related distribution services Company, completed the final
stage of a MBO led by Citicorp and the incumbent Chaimian. The deal was a direct result of a proxy fight between
the founding family, which controlled 30% of the Company and claimed it was being mismanaged, and the existing
directors. The deal included provisions to sell some divisions. 1987 and 1988 were fairly normal operating years
for LT. except for a large decrease in CAPX, which the Company justified as necessary for repaying debt. By the
end of 1989, although the Company had been generating operatmg profits, it had incurred net losses and had
accumulated a deficit, which resulted in violations of bank covenants. This led LT to announce further asset sales,
including a core division, as well as plans for a restructunng of its subordinated debt. lii 1990 a major customer did
not renew its contract with LT and the Company missed an interest payment. Tills forced LT into negotiations with
its senior debt providers as well, resulting in a restructuring plan proposal in 3/92.Reportedly,one of LT's main
junk bond holders, Carl Icahn, threatened to block the out of court restructuring and throw the Company into
Chapter II. This fmally forced the Company to file for Ch. 11 in 12/92, after having gathered a large cash reserve,
while cutting capital expenditures at the same time. LT emerged from Ch 11 in 9/93, with the old junk bond holders
getting 99% of the reorganized entity's equity. Relative to the last year before its recapitalization, by the time it
emerged from Ch. Ii, Leaseway Transportation's EBITDA / Sales had decreased 48% (36% industry-adjusted),
however with the sharp drop in capital outlays, Net Cash Flow / Sales actually increased an impressive 280% (545%
industry-adjusted).
K. H. Macy
In7/86, a group of investors lead by CEO Edward Finkelstein completed an MBO of R. H. Macy ("Macy"). The
immediate aftermath was positive, as Macy continued investing in store renovations and opening new locations.
However, in 1988, Macy made a bid for Federated, in order to prevent it from being bought by Campeau. Although
eventually losing out, Macy did acquire the Bullock's and I. Magnin chains from Federated for SI .1 billion, which
further leveraged the Company at a price analysts called "excessively rich". This acquisition coincided with a
36downturn in the retail industry, which by 1990 had forced Macy to engage in deep discounts to protect market share.
Analysts also accused the Company of focusing on private-label products to generate more short-term cash, to the
detriment of its upscale image. Still, markdowns lead to weak profits, and the Company eventually announced
plans to reduce debt and interest expense by selling more assets or equity. In October, 1990 Macv sold its finance
and credit card subsidiaries to GECC, apparently under pressure from banks. Capital expenditures were slashed, as
Company stopped opening new stores, while continuing to close down under performing I. Magriin locations.
During 1991, Mary reversed its aggressive discount policy, increasing prices to protect piofits, while sacrificing
market share. Company also started the largest television ad campaign in its history and sold new equity to existing
investors. Analysts commented that the Company was doing a lot better than Federated and Carter Hawley Hale.
Just when it looked like Macy was starting to recover, 1991 Christmas was worst ever, and Company was unable to
pay both creditors and suppliers. As banks refused to extend new credit lmes and suppliers stopped shipping, Macy
was forced to file for Chapter 11 in 1/92. CEO Frnkelstein resigned shortly thereafter. While in Ch. II, Macy used
the protections against creditors afforded by the bankruptcy laws to reject various leases, close down several stores
and utilize its cash flow to finance large investments in computerized poini of sale systems and inventory controls.
The Company also restructured its operations into two major divisions, consolidating personnel and facilities, and
laying off workers. Eventually, these investments bore fruit, as Macy's operating results were substantially
improved by the time the Company was sold to Federated in 12/94, as part of the bankruptcy reorganization. Still,
relative to the last year before the MBO, by the time the Company was sold EBITDA / Sales had decreased 58%
(51% industry-adjusted) and Capital EXT./Sales had fallen 62% (51% increase industry-adjusted), leading to an
overall Net Cash Flow / Sales decrease of 54% (47% indusy-adjusted).
MayflowerGroup
In12/86. Mayflower Group ["MG"), a trucking and school bus contractor, completed a MBO after having fought a
hostile bid from Laidlaw earlier in the year. The final price was just a few cents above Laidlaw's earlier offer,
which the Company had rejected as 'way too low." In the first two years after the LBO, MG implemented a cost
reduction program and completed the sale of its Consumer Products Umt, while at the same time expanding
operations in its core units, including hiring many new workers. Nevertheless, working capital continued to fall and
in 3/89. after a failed attempt to sell the Moving and Storage division to tts management, MG decided to seek
outside buyers for part or all of the Company. Later that year, MG expenenced an improved cash-flow position and
terminated the search for a buyer. By early 1990, trouble resurfaced and MG announced plans to spin off the two
remaining divisions, taking the more profitable Contract Services business public and selling the Traasit division to
management and employees. This plan never materialized, and in 6/91 MG was unable to make interest payments
on debentures. The Company closed down some agencies and cost cutting measures were implemented, and an
agreement with creditors was negotiated. MG filed for a pre-packaged bankruptcy in 1/92 and through a debt for
equity swap, substantially reduced it subordinated debt, emerging from bankruptcy in 3/92. As of 1991,
Mayflower's EBITDA / Sales had fallen only 2% (13% industry-adjusted), which coupled with large cuts in
investments, lead to an increase in Net Cash Flow / Sales of 451% (1090% industry adjusted).
Morse Shoe
In 3/88, Morse Shoe ("MS"). a footwear retailer, completed the fmal stage of a PvBO, launched in reaction to a
takeover attempt by minority investor A, Edelman. By the end of 1988, MS had completed a restructuring program
that included: accelerated closing of nearly 15% of the Company's stores,discontinuance of a merchandising
program, reduction of operating levels of inventory and overhead, closing and sale of a distribution facility, and
termination of the Company's over funded pension plan. At the same time, MS opened about 100 new retail units,
and planned on opening an additional 50 in 1989. However, these measures were not enough to counter the
economic malaise the retail industry experienced in 1990, and MS was forced to skip a scheduled interest payment
in 9/90. The Company had difficulty completing a restructuring in early 1991, and without the necessary bank and
trade financing, MS could not adequately replenish its inventories after the holiday season. At that point, MS
announced its cash from operations and other sources of financing would be inadequate to meet the short and long
term funding requirements of the business, absent a Chapter 11 filing. As a result, in 1/91 MS filed for Chapter Ii
relief, and in 3/91 the Company received final approval for DIP financing. MS emerged from Chapter 11 having
37closed lot) stores and swapped most debt for equitr. Relative to the last year before its recapitalization, by the time
it emerged from Ch. II, Morse Shoe's EBITDA ISaleshad declined by 34% (42% industn-adjusted) and Capital
Exp. / Sales had fallen 62% (66%), resulting in a overall drop of Net Cash Flow / Sales of 15% (25% industr-
adjusted).
National Gypsum
In 4/86, National Gypsum ('NO"), a manufacturer of gypsum and wallboard with interests also in engmeering and
construction services, completed an MBO. The deal prolected modest asset sales and continued strength in
construction industry to help repay onerous new debt obligations. However in 1988, as the construction industn'
went into a prolonged recession, dragging down gypsum demand and prices with it, NG started having difficulties
generating sufficient cash flow, and was forced to sell the American Olean tile business and other assets. By 1989
operating margins were half of pre-MBO levels and MG reported difficulty renewing its bank credit lines. The
Company reacted by restructuring its gypsum division: shut down sales offices and supply centers, laid off 25% of
work force, instituted TQM program. Also, despite reductions in total capital expenditures, the Company engaged
in major plant modernizations with a goal of becoming the lowest-cost producer inmdustrv.However, short-tenn
profitability continued to fall and in 1990 a loss in an asbestos litigation case created an unexpected cash need
which MG could not meet, as it had no available credit. The Company was forced to file for Ch. 11 m 10/90.
Shortly thereafter, CEO Hayes resied and new Chief Executive halted plant modernization plans, slashing capital
expenditures to maintenance levels. Still, pre-bankruptcy restructurings, combined with recovery in the gypsum
market, helped turn around operating results by 1992. Also, in order to settle asbestos claims, NO spun-off all
gypsum-related assets into a new firm, which would be owned by pre-bankruptcy investors, with remaining assets to
be held by an asbestos settlement fund. With this agreement, the new NO emerged from Ch. 11 in 7/93. Compared
to the last year before the buyout, by the time NG emerged from Ch. 11 its EBJTDA / Sales had fallen 75% (50%
industry-adjusted) and Capital Expenditures / Sales had fallen 66% (50% industry-adjusted), leading to a net
decrease in Net Cash Flow / Sales of 80% (44% industry-adjusted).
Papercraft
In 10/85. Papercraft announced it had accepted an MBO offer from a group lead by Citicorp and key managers.
The Company, which manufactured primarily holiday and packagmg products and household cleaning products,
had just come off a record year in terms of growth, and appeared to be doing quite well, By late 1986 operating
results started to suftèr, due to severe competition in the company's key gift wrap and Christmas tree segments, and
by late 1987 the company was forced to stop recording dividends on its preferred stock, due to limits set by debt
covenants. At that point, Papercraft announced that barring a restructunng of their debt, equity injection or strong
recovery in business prospects, the Company would be forced to cut capital expenditures, marketing expenses, and
might have to sell off more assets than planned. During 1988, Papercraft began to sell off some assets, including a
sale/leaseback of its main plant and headquarters, as well as disposing of its Canadian operations. Still, the
Company could not generate enough cash to meet debt obligations, and it defaulted on all its debt in 12/88. By
1989, Papercrafl was essentially selling itself off piece-meal, while attempting vanous debt restructunngs with its
bankers and subordinated debt holders. The Company did succeed in negotiating an exchange of its Sub. Debt for
new First Priority Notes, but in 1990 they defaulted on those as well. At that point, Papercra.ft admitted that it did
not expect to generate enough proceeds, whether from operations, assets sales, or otherwise, to pay back all its debt
obligations. Eventually, the Company filed for Ch. 11 in 3/91, and by that point it had been reduced to only two
divisions, with less than half of the Company's total pre-HLT sales. As part of the Ch. 11 settlement, Papercraft's
remaining operations were transferred to a new entity, which was spun-off to the old debt holders, while the MBO
investors lost everything. We were unable to obtain any operating results for the Company during its last two years
in distress (1990 and 1991).
Payless Cashways
In 10/88, a group of investors lead by management completed an MBO of Payless Cashways ("Pay ess"), a large
retailer of building materials and home improvement products. The deal was in reaction to an indication by an
investor that he would seek a hostile takeover of the Company. At the time of closing, management did not expect
38any asset sales, although some under perthnning stores were slated to be closed. Through 1991, everything
appeared to he all right. The Company's decision to focus on professional customers and its cost containment
efforts lead to strong growth in sales and cash flows, and debt repayments were ahead of schedule. Payless also
stopped opening new stores, shifting its (reduced) capital expenditures toward improving existing ones. In late 1991
however, things started to decline. First, the Company had to obtain amendments to its bank covenants. Then, in
1992, Payless had to cancel a proposed recap, which was intended to retire vanous sub. debt issues, as well as an
fF0. Following this, the Company announced that while it was currently in compliance with its covenants, if there
was no refinancing forthcoming, Payless would likely be in default by 1994. Analysts commented thai while the
Company was performing well and generating healthy cash flows, it had been severely overleveraged in the LBO.
and its inability to refinance was impairing its future value. Payless quickly obtained an extension on the maturity of
the outstanding term loans, but it wasn't until 1993 that they were able to complete a hill recapitalizatton, including
an IPO and various new debt issues and revised credit agreements. The result was a substantial reduction in debt,
and more importantly, short-term cash interest and pnncipal payment relief While in distress the Company did not
open new stores, but despite its claims that this was a deliberate strategy, it is.interesting to note that following the
recap Payless announced its intention to open seven new stores. Relative to the pre-I-ILT year, EBITDA ISalesgrew
11% by 1993(9% on an industry-adjusted basis), while Cap. Expenditures / Sales fell 69% (an 8% increase
industry-adiusted).
Pay N' Pak
In 3/88,PayN' Pak, which operated a chain of stores selling building materials and home improvement products,
was acquired in an lvO. The deal was a reaction to an unsolicited offer from Paul Bilzerian. At the time analysts
commented the Company had not been doing well, but should not be hard to "turn around," and the offer was
viewed as fair. During its first two post-I-Ri' years, Pay N' Pak continued opening new stores, as well as a program
of convening old stores into "warehouse" format. By 1990, however, things started to deteriorate, due to a sofl
retail environment, and the Company was forced to skip interest payments in order to purchase inventory for its key
Summer season. As a result, it soon found itself in default of all its debt obligations, and unable to draw on its
credit facilities. Pay N' Pak continued to negotiate a debt restructuring, but by late 1991 severe liquidity problems
forced the Company into Ch. II. Concurrent with the bankruptcy filing, Pay N' Pak announced a sweeping
reorganization, which would include selling 25% of its stores, reducing work force by 29% and other cost saving
measures. Pay N' Pak started selling off profitable stores to raise cash, and in mid-1992 announced further store
closings and lay-offs. Finally, unable to reach an agreement with creditors on new financing, and under pressure
from vendors, who were stopping shipments to the Company, Pay N' Pak announced it would liquidate itself in late
1992. The liquidation was completed in early 1993, and most unsecured trade creditors and junior debt holders
were not repaid. By the time it was liquidated, EBITDA / Sales had dropped about 97% (also industry-adjusted),
while CAPX / Sales had plunged 74% (76% industry-adjusted), relative to pre-NO levels.
Plantronics
In 3/89,agroup of investors including incumbent management, Citicorp and Kidder Peabody completed a buyout of
Plantronics, a telecommunications equipment manufacturer. The first couple of post-HLT years were reasonably
succesflil, with the Company completing planned non-core subsidiary divestitures in a timely fashion, resulting in a
substantially decreased debt load. However, by late fiscal 1990 the Company had to negotiate with its lenders to
loosen covenants on its credit agreement. Beginning in 1991, the Company initiated activities toward restructuring,
including the replacement of certain executives, moving some manufactunng to Mexico, and the hiring of financial
advisors. For the following three years, Plantronics' capital expenditures fell well below their previous-year
projections, and the Company ended up divesting its core Data Communications group. Around the same time, the
Plantronics CEO was replaced. In 1993 the Company concluded that its HLT-related goodwill had been hilly
impaired, and that the corresponding book value could not be justified, leading to a write-off of the entire remaining
balance. At that time the Company announced that barring any concessions in negotiations with creditors, it would
be forced to file for Chapter II. Management claimed the Plantronics' distress had been caused by its not meeting
1-ELT projections and unfavorable refinancing rates for HLT debt, and further exacerbated by its being forced to
discontinue some core products and operations. In late 1993, the Company and its creditors reached an agreement
39on a proposed recapitalization, which was accepted and completed Januan, 1994. The recapitalization included an
IPO and the issuing of new Senior Debt, the proceeds of which were used to retire all outstanding debt. Relative to
the last year fiscal year before the FThT. in its last year of distress EBI'FDA/Sales and Net Cash Flow ISaleshad
gro 38% and 52% respectively (53% and -37% industry-adjusted), while CAPX / Sales had plummeted 41%
(13% industry-adjusted).
RepublicHealth
In8/86. a group led by management completed a buyout of Republic Health ("Republic"), an owner and operator of
general acute care and specialty hospitals, with 86 facilities, The deal was iustified as a response to the "state of'
flux' and increased competition in health care, to which a private company would better be able to respond.
Analysts commented that Republic was already well leveraged and were divided on whether the pnce paid was fair
or too rich. In a bad sign, one of the original parthers in the deal, McDonnell Douglas, pulled out saying the price
had gotten too high. Already in its first year of post-LBO operation, Republic experienced a significant decline m
cash flow from operations due to increased competition and the increased pressure on margins from new
reimbursement policies of Medicare, In 6/87,theCompany hired a consulting firm to review its operations and
return the Company to profitability, as a result of which the Company sold four hospitals and, as part of a new
strategic plan, stopped making payments on its debentures. Top management was replaced, and a comprehensive
recapitalization was proposed, but the 1987stockmarket crash created difficulties and negotiations with the
Company's creditors stalled. In 1988, the Company sold 13 more hospitals and revised its plans to restructure debt,
receiving amendments to its Term Loan agreement that extended the maturity date from 8/92 to 8/93. During 1989
Republic sold 8 more hospitals, and in 10/89 proposed both an out-of-court recapitalization and a prepackaged
bankruptcy plan. By the deadline for receipt of consents in 12/89, the Company had not received sufficient votes to
consummate the recapitalization, but had enough to approve the Ch. 11 plan. As a result, in 12/89 Republic filed
for Chapter II and the Court quickly confirmed its already approved plan, significantly reducing the Company's
outstanding debt. Republic emerged from bankruptcy in 4/90. Relative to the pre-MBO fiscal year, by its last year
of distress Republic Health's EBITDA / Sales had fallen 47% (31% industry-adjusted) and its Net Cash Flows /
Sales had also declined by 36% (16% industiy-adjusted).
Revco
In 12/86, a group of investors including several top managers completed a buyout of Revco, a large retail drug store
chain. The deal included plans to divest all non-drug store operations, except the Odd Lot discount retail chain, and
sell under performing stores, concentrating in key markets. Initially, Revco was able to complete its asset sales and
cut operating costs. However, in 1987 an inventory reduction program, created to generate cash for debt repayment,
lead to stock imbalances and shorifalls, which required significant investments to correct, The Company did not
have enough available credit to fix inventory problems and make debt payments, and suppliers stopped shipping and
extending trade credit. By the time Revco obtained more credit lines, Christmas shipping had been disrupted,
leading to lost customers and weak sales. In addition, proceeds from asset sales were less than expected. The
Company was forced to sell Odd Lot unit and reduce investments in stores, leading to net store closings. CEO and
COO resigned. Still, these measures did not have enough short-term impact to prevent a default in 6/88, followed
shortly by a Chapter 11 filing. While in bankruptcy, Revco's liquidity position increased tremendously, which
together with the protections given by the court allowed the Company to reject many leases, shut dow'n or divest
hundreds of under performing stores and engage in an extensive store remodeling program, including installation of
computerized point of sale scanning systems in all stores. With these changes, Revco was able to turn its operating
performance around and emerge from Ch. 11 in much better competitive position. Still, relative to the pre-HLT
year, by time Revco emerged from bankruptcy EBITDA / Sales had decreased 35% (33% industry-adjusted) and
Capital Exp. / Sales had fallen 41% (3% increase industry-adjusted), leading to an overall Net Cash Flow / Sales
decrease of 31% (235% industry-adjusted).
RJR Nabisco
In3/89, KKR completed its hostile acquisition of RJR Nabisco, the world's second largest manufacturer of tobacco
products and a major food company, after one of the nastiest takeover contests ever. At the time, there was general
40consensus that the valuation was excessively high, and RJR would be hard pressed to generate enough cash to repay
it. The original deal already projected $5 billion of asset sales, to be carried out in the first twoyears of the huyout
However, the divestitures were completed within one year, and the pnces obtained were fair by any measure. Also,
operating results improved greatly, and by the end of 1989, RJR expected to issue investment grade debt shortly, to
replace existing bank credit. Then, in early 1990 the Company's debt was downgraded, and RJR was forced to pull
its announced debt issue. Also, there were $6 billion of debt which were to have their rates reset in 1991, but with
the unfavorable market conditions following the collapse of thejunk market, the uncertainty surrounding the new
rates on the reset notes prevented RJR from obtaining any new financing. Eventually, in late 1990 the Company was
forced to recapitalize, including a $1.7 billion equity injection from KKR, more than they had originally invested in
the entire deal. The deal also involved new' bank financing and the exchange of various tranches of reset notes for
new notes and preferred stock. By all accounts, RJR's troubles were due to the particular nature of its capital
structure, rather than business difficulties, as cash flows continued to show strong growth. Still, capital expenditures
were significantly cut, and as domestic tobacco market share slipped, some analysts were concerned that the RJR
could not afford the necessary investments to keep up with Philip Moms. Finally m 1991, the Company completed
a second recap, which included an IPO and various tranches of debt and PERCS, which took out the old credit
agreement, after which RJR was no longer classified as "highly leveraged" and the debt ratings were raised to
investment grade. Note that the stock was issued at $11 .25/sh, while KKR's basis m it was about $6.00/sh..The
recap was hailed by analysts as the crucial step in allowing R.JR to compete effectively in the tobacco market and
expand into emerging areas, such as China and the Middle East, where its competitors were already making inroads.
By the end of 1991. EBITDA / Sales had grown 26% (21% industry-adj.) and Capital Exp. / Sales dropped 54%
(20% increase industry-adjusted), leading to an overall increase in Net Cash Flows / Sales of 63% (16% industry-
adjusted).
SeamanFurniture
In2/88.agroup of investors led by KKRofferedto acquire Seaman Furniture ("Seaman"), a specialty retailer of
furniture operating primarily in the greater New York area. The Seaman family, which controlled the Company,
would remain in charge alter the deal. At the time of the deal, Seaman announced it planned no asset sales, and in
fact, was to continue a major expansion into the Philadelphia market. In 1988, as part of its effort to enter new
markets, Seaman launched a major new advertising campaign, in addition to the opening of new stores and the
buying of a warehouse. The Company acknowledged these measures would depress margins and leave the
Company with limited reserves to react to adverse changes in business or economic conditions, hut viewed them as
essential for the long-term growth of Seaman. In 1989, an economic slowdown in the markets served by the
Company caused a steep reduction in operating mcome and led to a missed principal debt payment. Seaman began
negotiations for restructuring with its lenders, and m 11/89 an agreement was reached, including reduced
indebtedness, exchange of debentures, along with a much needed capital inftision from KKR and officers. In 1990,
the Seaman family members left the Company, and their stake was bought back for $1. Despite a continuing weak
economy, in 1991 Seaman aggressively expanded, opening eight new stores. However, by I 992 the unexpected
decline in sales volume, operating income and cash flows in the years 1989 through 1991 finally caught up with the
Company, which admitted that it could not support its current debt structure, The Company's cash flow problems
resulted in vendors losing confidence, followed by a withdrawal of trade credit and other favorable contract terms.
Between October and December 1991, the Company negotiated with its senior lenders, but in late 12/91 it became
apparent that they would be unable to reach an agreement on a long-term restructuring plan. Without sources to
find and obtain trade credit for continuing operations, unable to make interest payments due 12/91 and facing
possible cross-defaults under their subordinated debt obligations, Seaman determined that seeking bankruptcy was
its only recourse. Accordingly, in 1/92 the Company filed for Chapter 11. Seaman was granted DIP financing, and
the CEO was replaced. As part of its reorganization plan, Seaman would close 15 of its 38 stores, including a total
withdrawal from the Philadelphia market. The Company emerged from Chapter 11 in 9/92. Relative to the pre-
MBO fiscal year, by its last year of distress Seaman Furniture Company's EBITDA / Sales had fallen 96%
(industry-adjusted as well) and its Capital Expenditures / Sales had shrunk to zero, resulting in a total drop in Net
Cash Flow / Sales of 87% (91% industry-adjusted).
41Spcciatty Equipmcnt
In9/88, a group of investors lead by members of management, acquired Specialty Eqwpment ("SE') man MBO.
The Company was a manufacturer of food service equipment for pnmarily for restaurants, food stores and hotels.
Its first post-l-UJ year was a good one, with SE increasing its capital outlays while staying ahead of scheduled debt
repayments. However, during 1989 a slow-down in the fast food restaurant and convenience store industries.
together with increased price competition, lead to severe losses. These were worsened in 1990, as the Company
defaulted on its debt, causing suppliers and customers to cut back on their dealings with SE. The Company began a
reorganization. including a new cash management program, cost cutting efforts, and sales of under performing
assets. However, these measures were not sufficient, and in 12/90 the Company began to seek an agreement with its
Senior and Subordinated debt holders. Having obtained an agreement, in 12/91 SE filed for a pre-packaged
bankruptcy, which was approved, and the Company emerged in 3/92, with old Subordinated debtors holding
essentially all the equity in the reorganized entity. SE commented in its Ch. 11 POR that its Senior lenders had
continued to extend credit during the default period, while the reorganization was being negotiated. They attributed
this to the realization by creditors that the Company was an industry leader, with successful operations, and that it
was mutually beneficial to all to make the financial restructuring as non-disruptive as possible to day-to-day
operations. Between the last pre-l-ILT fiscal year, and the last year of distress, EBITDA / Sales and Net Cash Flows
/ Sales both fell 44% (62% industry-adjusted).
Southland
In 12/87 Southland, the largest convenience store operator in the world through its flagship 7-Eleven brand,
underwent a MBO lead by members of the Company's founding family. The transaction was structured in two
parts I) a tender offer for 2/3 of outstanding shares, completed in 7/87; and 2) an exchange offer for the remaining
shares, to occur later in the year. The plan also called for the Company to divest all non-convenience store
operations, except its 50% stake in Citgo, in order to meet its new debt obligations. However, between the first and
second stages, the stock market crashed in October 1987, causing the collapse of the junk market, and with it the
major source of financing for Southland's tvffiO. As a result, the Company was forced to significantly raise the
interest rates on the junk issues, as well as providing an "equity kicker" to debt holders. The harsher terms pushed
Southland's debt burden well beyond initial projections, and by 1988 the Company remarked it had been forced to
cut back on store remodellings and new openings, in order to meet covenants under bank loans. Soon, Southland
was forced to sell its stake in Citgo, as well as food distribution centers and store chains in vanous states, in order to
generate cash. The Company cut back on advertising and inventories, as well as store maintenance. In late 1989,
Southland announced it would not be able to meet debt obligations unless it could negotiate a significant capital
restructuring. Suppliers reduced shipments and restricted Southland's trade credit. Restructuring costs were
offsetting all the benefits from any operating efficiencies due to centralized purchasing and inventory control,
following the MBO. By mid-I 990, stores were so run down and product offerings so limited, that Southland's
customers were going elsewhere, and its Japanese partner, Ito-Yokado, offered to buy 75% of the Company in order
to fix up the stores and restore Southland's hurt image, which was damaging their busmess in Japan. The Company,
faced with no alternative sources of financing, eventually filed for a pre-packaged bankruptcy m 10/90, as a result
of which Southland agreed to sell 70% of its equity to Ito-Yokado and distribute 25% to its existing creditors,
together with newly issued debt and wanants. The Company emerged from bankruptcy in 3/91. Relative to the
pre-MBO fiscal year, by its last year of distress Southland's EBITDA / Sales had fallen 32% (same mdustry-
adjusted) and its Capital Expenditures / Sales had fallen 94% (78% industry-adjusted).
Supermarkets General
In 10/87, a group of investors lead by Merrill Lynch and management completed a buyout of Supermarkets General
("SO"), a large supermarkets and drug store retailer in the Northeastern US, in response to a hostile bid from the
Hall family. At the time analysts commented that given its excessively rich valuation and resulting leverage, SG
would have to sell many assets, as well as reduce its pnce competitiveness to protect margins. The Company denied
these suggestions. However, by 1989 results from operations, while good, were well below projections, due mainly
to weak performance in Rickel home centers division and mediocre growth in customer volume overall. This lead to
the resignation of both the President and the CEO, exposing the internal conflicts within management over
42corporate strategy. with the winners supporting a more short-term focus, so as to meet debt obligations. The
Company restructured Rickel. hut it was not enough, and by late 1990 SO announced that in view of its stagnant
results, it would be in violation of debt covenants if it could not reach a significant debt restructuring soon. In
particular, the Company was concerned that the limits on capital expenditures would he tightened, preventing them
from expanding at a time when their competitors were all building new stores. SO's fir st recapitalization mvolved
an equity injection, a renegotiated credit agreement and the repurchase of some sub debt and preferred stock. This
was merely a temporary measure though, and in 1991 SG was forced to sell tts Purity Supreme division. Although
the business had been under performing, and the sale made sense, analysts believed the price had been too low,
reflecting a certain urgency on the part of the Company to raise cash.. Still, the recession continued to hammer
margins, and by late 1992 50 announced that it was writing off all remaining goodwill ($600MM), and that unless
it could recapitalize soon, under the terms of its existing debt agreements capital expenditures would have to be kept
at a level which uld lead to the long-term insolvency of the Company. As a result, in 1994 SO completed a
massive recapitalization, including spm-off of Rickel, new bank credit agreement and various new public debt
issues, as well as loosened covenants on remaining debt. The deal was supposed to include an IPO, but continued
weakness in operating results prevented the Company from realizing a "fair value" for the stock according to
management. Still, by 1994 SO's EBITDA / Sales had grown 37% (25% industry-adj.), while Cap. Exp. / Sales fell
33% (44% ind-adj.), with an overall boost to Net Cash Flows! Sales of 150% (61% industry-adjusted).
USG
In 7/88, USC, the largest producer and distributor of gypsum wallboard intheUS, completed a leveraged
recapitalization in order to fight off a hostile bid from a group of Texas oil men. The recap plans called for the
Company to sell of many divisions and concentrate in core gypsum and ceiling products businesses, reversing its
previous strategy of growth by acquisitions. Also, work force would be reduced and capital expenditures curtailed,
although USO did not expect any adverse effect, since its plants were in excellent condition. Initially all went well:
asset sales proceeds exceeded projections, operating costs were lowest in mdusti'y and following some plant
closures, USC's capacity utilization farexceededcompetitors', despite depressed gypsum market. However, by
mid-1990 it became clear the gypsum market was not going to recover, and with revenues significantly below recap
projections, USG was having difficulty meeting debt payments. In 12/90, the firm defaulted on its debt. In 1991,
USC sold its DAt' sealants division and implemented a new round of layoffs and investment cuts. A proposed
exchange offer failed due to continued weak demand for gypsum products, which necessitated a more
comprehensive restructuring. This was eventually achieved in late 1992, when all creditors agreed to the terms of a
pre-packaged bankruptcy, filed in 3/93, USC emerged from Ch. II two months later. Importantly, between default
date and bankruptcy filing, IJSG maintained unchanged relations with customers, suppliers and employees and did
not sell core assets. The Company emerged from Ch. II as the strongest competitor in the gypsum industry.
Compared to the last thU fiscal year before its recapitalization, by the time was in its last year of distress EBITDA /
Sales had fallen 55% (14% industry-adjusted) while Capital Expenditures! Sales had been slashed by 58% (41%
industiy-adjusted), leading to a net decrease in Net Cash Flow / Sales of 54% (10% increase industry-adjusted).
Jim Walter
In1/88 a group of investors lead by KKR and key members of management completed a buyout of Jim Walter
("Walter"), a builder of partially-fmished and shell homes, with interests also in coal mimng, manufacturing of
pipes and other construction products. The Company announced plans to sell assets accounting for nearly half of
pre-I-ILT revenues. One of the assets divested was Celotex, which had been an asbestos manufacturer until the early
1970's, and was being sued by thousands of claimants for asbestos-related damages. By late 1989, asset sales and
debt payments were on schedule, when Walter was sued by Celotex asbestos litigants seeking to obtain access to
Company assets as part of asbestos settlements. The suit caused the Company to halt its asset sales program, as well
as prevented the mandatory reset of interest rates on various Reset Note issues. Añer a proposed exchange offer
failed, the Company went into default and was forced to file for Ch. 11, as the cancellation of the assets sale
program meant Walter could not generate enough cash to meet its debt obligations. After filing, the Company used
its improved liquidity position to increase capital expenditures and never took out a DIP credit facility, indicating
lack of any post-filing financial constraints. Operations proceeded normally, as Walter waited for a legal ruling on
43its claim that it had tiC) liability in asbestos cases. Along the way, the Companys debt was bought by a groupof
investors led by Apollo, who eventually forced a reorganization plan which included a settlement with the asbestos
litigants. Walter emerged from Ch, 11 in 3/95.Inits last year of distress, EBITDA / Sales had grown by 24%
relative the pre-FifiT fiscal year, while Capital Expenditures / Sales had been reduced by 8%, leading to an overall
increase in Net Cash Flow / Sales of 34% over that period.
WcIbilt
In 7/88 Welbilt, a foodservice equipment manufacturer and domestic appliance distributor, accepted a huyout bid
from a group of investors led by management and Kohlberg. The Company had recently been named by Forbes as
one of the the 200 best managed companies in the US, and had expenenced spectacular growth relative over
previous decade, particularly relative to industry peers. In the first post-l-ThT year, Welbilt acquired the assets of a
large foodsers'ice equipment manufacturer. The acquisition was fmanced through an amendment in the Company
credit agreement and an equity contribution from the 1-ILT investor group. In 1990, citing poor operating
performance, the Company made a few adjustments, changing some management positions, consolidating corporate
staff and relocating its headquarters, and closing its Bakery Group operations. In 1991, Welbilt's CEO was
replaced. During 1992, the Company issued new senior debt, amended its credit agreement and received a further
capital injection from the equity investors, buying some time before an eventual IPO. Around that time Moody's
cited, in a report justiring a rating upgrade on Welbilt debt, that the Company's precarious financial condition and
"thin coverage were moderated by its leading industry position and the infusion of additional equity". Finally, in
November of 1993, having avoided default and with the IPO market boommg, the Company announced an initial
public offering that was used to retire all remaimng Subordinated debt, as well as reduce Senior debt to a
manageable level. By the time of its IPO in late 1993, Welbilt's EBITDA / Sales and Net Cash Flow / Sales had
improved by 24% and 34% respectively, relative to the pre-HLT figures (16% and -5%industry-adjusted),and

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Summary of pre- and post-l-ILT (highly leveraged transactions) leverage statistics for sample of HLTs comprising both MBOs
(management buyouts) and leveraged recapitalizations completed between 1980 and 1989 which subsequently become
distressed. Pre-HLT capitalization figures are based on last available balance sheet before announcement of lILT. Pre-L-ILT
income statement figures (EBITDA and interest expense) are based on financial statements for fiscal year preceding year in
which HLT was announced, in most cases already adjusted to exclude operations to be discontinued following FILT. Post-
hILT capitalization figures are based on first available balance after HLT completion. Post-FILT income statement figures are
based on financial statements for first full fiscal year following year in which hILT is completed. Total equity is defined as
total compensation paid to pre-HLT shareholders, which for MROs includes value of all cash and securities received, and for
leveraged recapitalizations includes value of dividends received, both cash and securities, plus ex-dividend value of equity.
Total capital is pre-I-ILT book value of debt, plus pre-HLT preferred stock (at liquidation preference) plus total equity. Interest
expense includes both cash and non-cash components.
Book Value of Debt / Total
Capital EBITDA I Interest Expense
Company Total Equity Total Capital Pre-HLT Post-LILT Pre-L-ILT Post-HLT
($MM) ($MM)
American Standard 2.431 2,846 015 102 14.24 147
Bucyrus Erie 289 319 0.09 0.33 1.47 097
Burlington Industries 2.447 2,851 0.14 1.04 948 128
Cherokee 380 387 0.02 0.47 29.40 1.21
FloridaSteel 306 381 0.20 1.06 8.71 2.08
Fort Howard 3.569 4,050 0.12 0.91 14.36 1.05
Fruehauf 947 1,555 0.39 1.08 3.70 1.20
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 2.541 3,353 0.24 0.97 9.37 1.12
Harvard Industries 229 392 0.41 0.83 2.89 0,38
Hills Stores 717 873 0.18 0.85 13.70 1.88
Interco 2,908 3,492 0.17 0.90 9.56 0.55
KDI 184 242 0.24 1.08 7.50 0.57
Leaseway Transportation 600 1,000 0.40 0.63 4.90 2,47
R. H. Macv 3,518 4,829 0.27 0.86 5.52 1,47
Mayflower 249 363 0.31 0.92 8.97 1 .63
Morshe Shoe 258 342 0.25 1.08 3.80 0.79
National Gypsum 1.57! 1,698 0.07 0.89 19,43 1.41
Papercrafl 262 269 0.03 0.86 NA 0.76
Payless Cashways 963 1,251 0.23 0.9! 7.5! 1.08
PayNPak 213 298 0.29 1.01 2.39 1.17
Plantronics 153 174 0.12 0.99 34.33 0.8!
Republic Health 359 858 0.58 0.95 1.91 0.56
Revco 1.249 1,554 0.20 1.07 7.42 0.67
RJkNabisco 24.56! 30,102 0.18 0.97 6.29 1.32
Seaman Furniture 337 355 0.05 0.98 19.84 0,47
Specialty Equipment 326 427 0.24 0.97 4.06 1.16
Southland 3.810 5,307 0.28 0.91 6.93 0.77
Supermarkets Genera! 1,828 2,037 0.10 0.93 10.34 1.18
IJSG 2,175 3,026 0.28 1.04 8.39 1.35
Jim Walter 2,408 3,250 0.26 1.06 4.70 0.99
Welbilt 213 254 0.16 0.74 9.38 1.27
Median 717 1,000 0.20 95 7.95 1.16
Mean 2.000 2,520 0.21 0.9! 9.68 1.13
Std, Dew. 4.349 5,335 0.12 0.17 7.62 0.47Table 3
Summary of potential sources of financial distress and estimated impact of each source on cash flows for a sample of HLTs comprising both Ml3Os
(management buyouts) and leveraged recapitalizations completed between 1980 and 1989 which subsequently become distressed. Year t = 0 denotes
fiscal year in which Company experienced onset of distress (see Table I). Industry medians are based on universe of firms in same Value Line industry
classification as Company. Financial data on industry comparables is obtained from COMPIJSTAT. Change in LIBOR is calculated as nominal increase
in 3-month LIBOR at fiscal year end. Portion of distress due to a source (cash shortfall due to source / sum of cash shortfall dueto all sources). Cash
shortfall due to industry performance calculated as amount by which cash flow (EBITDA - Interest Expense) would improve if Company had same
operating performance relative to industry median in year t = 0, but industry median had same EBITDA / Sales as in year t-t. Cash shortfall due to
firm performance calculated as amount by which cash flow would improve if Company had same EBITDA / Sales as industry median in year 1 =0.
Cash shortfall due to leverage calculated as amount by which cash flow would improve if Company had same Interest Expense / Assets as industry
median in year t = 0. Cash shortfall due to short-term rate changes calculated as amount by which cash flow would improve if Company hadpaid
interest on floating rate debt (proxied by bank debt) at same rate as in year t = -I.
Interest Expense /
EBITDA / Sales (t=O) Assets (t=0) Change from t=-l to t0 Portion of Distress due to
Ind. Median Short-Term
tndustry Industry EBITDA I Industry Firm Rate
Company Company Median CompanyMedian Sales LIBOR Performance Performance LeverageChanges
American Standard 9.8% 5.9% 8.5% 3.t% -33.9% -3,36 0.97 -0.75 0.96 -0.18
Bucyrus Erie 10.7% 5.5% 12.4% 1.1% -13.8% -3.36 0.28 -0.84 1.56 0.00
Burlington Industries 10.2% 9.2% 12.6% 3.5% -4.1% -0.76 0.06 -0.14 1.12 -004
Cherokee 10.7% 7.7% 12.6% 3.2% -5.9% -1,24 0.09 -0.38 1.32 -0.02
FloridaSteel 9.3% 7.6% 7.4% 2.2% -31.1% -2.53 0.59 -0.25 0.77 -0.11
Fort Howard 39,9% 16.3% 11.7% 2.6% -13.6% -0.57 0.59 -2.22 2.68 -0.05
Fruehauf 6.4% 7.7% 5.7% 1.7% 59.6% 1.69 -0.84 0.47 1.31 0.06
HarcourtBraceJovanovich8.4% 12.8% 13.3% 1.7% -20.5% -1.05 0.07 0.15 0.78 0.00
Harvard Industries 3.0% 10.1% 9.5% 3.1% -13.1% -0.76 0.04 0.55 0.42 -0.01
Hills Stores 5.7% 7.5% 14.7% 2.3% -7.2% -0.99 0.07 0.27 0.67 -0.01
Interco 101% 8.1% 26.4% 2.9% 37.0% -1.43 -0.25 -0.19 1.50 -0.06
8.2% 8.8% 11.4% 1.6% 5.2% -1.05 -0.03 0.05 1,04 -0.05
Leaseway Transportation 11.0% 10.2% 8.6% 4,6% -5.2% -1.05 0.27 -0.34 I. t8 -0.11
R. H. Macy 9.9% 7.3% 11.1% 3.0% -1.5% -0.95 0.03 -0.54 1.52 -0.02
Mayflower 6.3% 11.1% 8.3% 4.4% 8.7% -0.57 -0.08 0.77 0.31 0.00
Morshe Shoe 8.5% 8.1% 14.8% 2.9% 37.0% -1.05 -0.55 -0.11 1.69 -0.03
National Gypsum 11.7% 8.5% 10.1% 2.1% -17.2% 1.45 0.24 -0.32 1.08 0.00
Papercraft [2.8% 12.5% 13.1% 1.7% -0.5% 1.69 0.00 -0.02 0.97 0.05
Payless Cashways 8.2% 5.0% 10.5% 1.6% -17.0% -3.11 0.47 -0.91 1.53 -0.09
Pay N' Pak 6.1% 6.0% 9.3% 1.9% -2.9% -1.76 0.04 -0.04 1.08 -0.08
Plantronics t7. 1% 13.7% 16.4% 6.5% 0.0% -2.36 0.00 -0.41 1.58 -0.17
RepublicHealth 11,4% 16.5% 14.2% 4.5% -1,3% 0.98 0.01 0.26 0.71 0.02
Revco 4.0% 5.7% 7.8% 2.4% 7.3% 0.16 -0.05 0.31 0.74 0.00
RiRNabisco 24.6% 5.3% 8.1% 4,1% -11.3% -1.05 -0.58 3.55 -2.09 0.11
Seaman Fumiture 7.6% 10.6% 11.4% 2.0% -8,6% 3.02 0.04 0.15 0.67 0,14
SpeciattvEquipment 15.5% 14.8% 11,1% 2.1% 12.8% -0.99 -0.17 -0,07 1.31 -0.07
Southland 5,4% 5.4% 11.5% 2.7% -3.1% [.45 0.03 0.00 0.92 0.06
Supermarkets General 5.4% 5.7% 10.0% 2.7% 0.2% -0.99 0.00 0.11 0.92 -0.02
LJSG 15.1% 8.9% 17.0% 2.5% 4.8% -0.57 -0.13 -1.11 2.28 -0.04
Jim Walter 27.8% 12.8% 11.6% 6.5% 20.2% -1,24 0.62 2.00 -1.68 0.06
Welbilt 7.2% 14.8% 11.6% 2.1% [2.8% -0.57 -0.06 0.56 0.52 -0.02
Median 9.8% 8.5% 11,4% 2.6% -2.9% -0.99 0.03 -0.04 1.04 -0.02
11.2% 9.4% 11.7% 2.9% -0.2% -0.74 0.06 0.02 0.95 -0.02
7.5% 3,4% 3.8% 1.3% 19.3% 1.50 0.36 0.96 0,91 0.07Table 4
Summary of pro-forma EBITDA/lnterest coverage ratios, estimated by eliminating impact of potential sources of financial
distress for a sample of HLTs comprising both MBOs (management buyouts) and leveraged recapitalizations completed
between 1980 and 1989 which subsequently become distressed. Year t =0denotes fiscal year in which Company experienced
onset of distress (see Table I). Industry medians are based on universe of firms in same Value Line industry classification as
Company. Financial data on industry comparables is obtained from COMPUSTAT. Change in LIBOR is calculated as nominal
increase in 3-month LIBOR at fiscaL year end. Pro-forma coverage due to a source =( pro-formaEBITDA due to source / pro-
forma Interest Expense due to source ).Pro-formaEBITDA due to industry performance calculated as EBITDA Company
would have reported if it had same operating performance relative to industry median in year t =0,but industry median had
same EBITDA / Sales as in year t =-1.Pro-forma EBITDA due to firm performance calculated as EBITDA Company would
have reported if it had same EBITDA / Sales as industry median in year t =0.Pro-Forma interest expense due to leverage
calculated as interest expense Company would have reported if it had same Interest Expense / Assets as industry median in
year t0. Pro-forma interest expense due to short-term rate changes calculated as interest expense Company would have
reported if it had paid interest (proxied by 3-month LIBOR) on floating rate debt (proxied by total bank debt outstanding) at
same rate as in year t =-1.Pro-forma EBITDA if EBITDA / Sales margin as of t=-l calculated as EBITDA Company would
have reported if it had same EBITDA / Sales margin as in last pre-distress fiscal year (Year -1).
Pro-forma
Pro-forma Coverage due to Coverage if
EBITDA IInterest Industry Firm Firm Change in Short- EBITDAJSaIes
Company Expense (t=0) PerfonnancePerformance Leverage Term Rates Margin as of 1=-i
American Standard 1.27 1.92 0.76 3.52 1.14 1.37
Bucyrus Erie 1.02 1 18 0.53 11.97 1.02 0.97
Burlington Industries 0.89 0.93 0,80 3.18 0.87 1.08
Cherokee 0.77 0.82 0.56 3.02 0.76 1.03
Florida Steel 1.17 1.70 0.95 3.87 1.06 1.68
Fort Howard 1.09 1.26 0.44 4.78 1.07 1.11
Fruehauf 1.20 0.75 1.45 4.0! 1.23 0.52
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 0.32 0.40 0.49 2.5! 0.32 0,76
Harvard Industries 0.38 0.44 1.26 1.18 0.37 1.09
Hills Stores 1.08 1.16 1.41 6.79 1.07 1.42
Interco 0.55 0.40 0,44 4.95 0.53 0.52
LCD! 0.57 0.54 0.61 4.02 0.55 0.74
Leaseway Transportation 1.93 2,04 1.80 3.63 1.85 1.84
R. H. Macy 1.00 1.02 0.74 3.76 1.00 1.34
Mayflower 1.54 1.42 2.73 2.91 1.54 2.01
Morshe Shoe 0.97 0.71 0.92 4.86 0.96 0.78
Nationai Gypsum 0.87 1.06 0.64 4.3! 0.87 1.37
Papereraft 0.73 0.73 0.7! 5.6! 0.76 0.76
Payless Cashways 1.27 1.53 0.76 8.48 1.21 1.29
Pay N' Pak 1.0! 1.04 0.98 4.9! 0.96 1.50
Plantronics 0.78 0.78 0.63 1.96 0.73 0,74
Republic Health 0.56 0.57 0.8! 1.76 0.57 1.03
Revco 0.67 0.62 0.96 2.2! 0.67 0.99
RJRNabisco 1.07 1.2! 0.23 2.11 1,04 0.93
Seaman Furniture 0.47 0.5! 0.65 2.67 0.57 0.68
Specially Equipment 0.91 0.80 0.86 4.83 0.87 1.08
Southland 0,77 0.80 0.77 3.28 0.8! 0.36
Supermarkets General 1.35 1.35 1.44 4.99 1.32 1.26
USC 1.02 0.97 0.60 6.85 1.00 1,19
Jim WaIter 0.98 0.8! 0.45 1.76 0.96 0,94
Welbilt 0.84 0.75 1.72 4.68 0.82 1.32
Median 0.97 0.82 0.76 3.87 0.96 1.08
Mean 0.94 0.98 0.9! 4.17 0.92 1.09
Std. Dev. 0.34 0.43 0.51 2.18 0.32 0.38Table 5
Nominal, market-adjusted and industry-adjusted returns generated by a sample of HLTs comprising both MBOs (management huyouts) and leveraged
recapitalizations completed between 1980 and 1989 which subsequently become distressed, Retuns on pre-HLT capital denote returns to total capital
invested from two months before announcement of any LILT to date of distress resolution. Retuns on post-ULT total capital denote returns to total
capital invested in ULT from FILT date to date of distress resolution. Retuns on post-I-ILl equity denote returns to total equity invested in LILT from
HLT date to date of distress resolution. Pre-HLT total capital is defined as book value of debt + preferred stock (at liquidation preferrence) + market
value of equity. two months before announcement of HLT. Post-liLT total capital is defined as book value of debt + preferred stock (at liquidation
preference)total equity invested, at liLT date. Nominal returns on capital = (sum of all payments to capital) / total capital. Payments to capital
include cash interest and debt principal repaid, dividends paid, equity repurchased. and total value received by capital at distress resolution, net of
proceeds from nen equity and debt issues. Nominal returns on equity = (sum of all payments to liLT equity) / liLT equity. Payments to liLTequit
include dividends paid. equity repurchased and total value realized by equity at distress resolution. Market-adjusted and industry-adjusted returns are
calculated similarly to nominal returns, except that payments to total capital and to equity are adjusted for the return over the same period on.
respectively: (I) the CRSP value-weighted portfolio of NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stock, and (2) an equally-weighted portfolio of stocks in each
Company's Value Line industry sector.
Returns on Pre-HLT Toi,al Capital Returns on Post-HLT Total Capital Returns on Post-liLT Equity
Market- Industry- Market' Industry- Market- industry-
Company Nominal Adiusted Adjusted Nominal Adjusted Adiusted Nominal Adjusted Adjusted
AmericanStandard 353% 114% 134% 101% 16% 48% 410% 141% 213%
Bucvrus Erie 29% 18% 20% t3% -48% -41% 73% -87% -84%
Burlington Industries 143% 93% 92% 39% 17% t2% 139% 87% 76%
Cherokee 100% 16% 56% 16% -20% 14% -69% -81% -69%
Florida Steel 82% 15% 17% 24% -21% -24% -61% -78% -80%
Fort Howard 125% 13% 23% 57% -15% -9% 2% -56% -55%
Fmehauf 45% 2% 12% 0% -18% -20% -61% -74% -70%
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 44% 8% 28% -19% -35% -23% -94% -96% -95%
Harvard Industries 44% -9% -5% -2% -38% -41% -90% -94% -95%
Hills Stores 85% -7% -24% 65% -11% -26% 16% -18% -29%
Interco 28% -12% -28% -17% -39% -47% -100% -100% -100%
lCD] 11% -17% 5% -26% -43% -33% -100% -100% -100%
Leasewav Transportation 27% -17% -11% 11% -12% -17% -98% -99% -99%
R.H.Macy 88% -22% -14% 51% -23% 1% -100% -l00% -100%
Mayflower 37% -5% 1% 22% -18% -3% -81% -91% -89%
Morshe Shoe 1% -37% -52% -33% -54% -60% -95% -97% -98%
National Gypsum 109% 18% 26% 1% -27% -19% -93% -94% -93%
Papercraft 4% -40% -52% -17% -46% -54% -100% -100% -100%
PavlessCashways 180% 49% 53% 86% 6% -1% 19% -40% -48%
Pay N'Pak 21% -13% -15% -22% -47% -47% -100% -100% -100%
Plantronics 183% 64% -5% t13% 42% -20% 776% 413% 65%
Republic Health 3% -36% -25% -16% -37% -34% -98% -98% -98%
Revco 14% -24% -5% -19% -49% -44% -100% -100% -100%
RJRNabisco 164% 67% 20% 46% 14% -4% 126% 40% -36%
Seaman Furniture -72% -79% -66% -75% -85% -74% -100% -100% -100%
Specialty Equipment 7% -35% -14% -18% -45% -24% -100% -100% -100%
Southland 62% 28% 4% 18% 1% -13% -90% -92% -94%
Supermarkets General NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
54% 12% 28% 1% -34% -19% -97% -98% -98%
Jim Walter 89% 21% 42% 37% -26% -31% -4% -58% -63%
Welbilt 184% 60% 128% 108% 9% 66% 193% 34% 116%
Median 50% 5% 4% 12% -25% -22% -90% -93% -93%
Mean 75% 8% 12% 18% -23% -19% -7% -48% -57%
Std. Dcv. 82% 42% 46% 45% 27% 29% 187% 106% 76%Table 6
Summary statistics on median growth in operating, capital expenditures mid net cash flow margins for a sample of HLTs comprising both
MBOs (management buyouts) and leveraged recapitalizations completed between 1980 mid 1989 which subsequently become distressed.
Nominal and industry-adjusted median growth caLculations are adjusted for negative base-year values by defining individual Company and
industry base-year variables as max[ variable(base-year), 0.0 ]. Pre-HLT is last flaIl year before fiscal year in which HLT was announced.
Post-HLT is first full fiscal year after completion of 1-ILT. Year t = 0 denotes fiscal year in which Company experienced onset of distress
(for actual dates correponding to these events for each Company, see Table 1). Pre-resolution is last full fiscal year before distress resolution.
Post-resolution is first full fiscal year after distress resolution. Industry adjusted growth is given by nominal growth less growth in median
industry variable over same period. Industry medians are based on universe of firms in same Value Line industry classification as Company.
Financial data on industry comparables is obtained from COMPUSTAT. Figures in parenthesis indicate number of observations used to
calculate median growth, which might be less than full sample size (10) due to unavailability of firm or industry data for certain years.
Panel A: Pie-1-ILT to
Pie- Post-
Post-tILT 0 +1 +2 Resolution Resolution
EBITDA / Sales
Nominal Growth 12.8% -18.2% -34.4% -19.0% -27.2% -14.9%
(31) (31) (30) (27) (30) (21)
Industry Adjusted Growth 1.7% -13.3% -22,6% -6.7% -10.9% -12.4%
(31) (3!) (30) (27) (30) (21)
CAPXI Sales
NominalGrowth -44.8% -47.6% -55.8% -54.5% -58.6% -44.1%
(31) (31) (30) (27) (30) (20)
IndustryAdjusted Growth 40.7% -44.4% -34.2% -25.8% -37,8% -14.2%
(31) (31) (30) (27) (30) (20)
NCF / Sales
Nominal Growth 52.9% 14.6% -33.4% 0.3% -0.2% 29.9%
(31) (31) (30) (27) (30) (20)
Industry Adjusted Growth 54.5% 28.1% -31.3% 11.2% -3.2% 22.0%
(31) (31) (30) (27) (30) 20)
Panel B: Year-I to
Pre- Post-
0 +1 +2 Resolution Resolution
EBITDA/ Sales
NominalGrowth -16.1% -29.6% -14.7% -22.9% -7.1%
(31) (30) (27) (30) (21)
Industry Adjusted Growth -17.0% -24.2% -8.6% -16.9% -12.3%
(31) (30) (27) (30) (21)
CAPX / Sales
NominalGrowth -12.6% -25.2% -16.6% -21.9% 2.9%
(31) (30) (27) (30) (20)
Industry Adjusted Growth -10.6% -14.6% -7.3% -9.8% 11.0%
(31) (30) (27) (30) (20)
NCF / Sales
Nominal Growth -17.0% -34.4% -18.1% -30.2% -9.0%
(31) (30) (27) (30) (20)
Industry Adjusted Growth -8.8% -36.7% -34.9% 44.7% -16.7%
(31) (30) (27) (30) (20)
PaneIC: Yeai0to
Pm- Post-
+1 +2 Resolution Resolution
EBITDA I Sales
Nominal Growth -15.0% -II .4% -18.5% 3.3%
(30) (27) (30) (21)
Industry Adjusted Growth -10.8% -5.4% -22.8% 14.7%
(30) (27) (30) (21)
CAPX / Sales
Nominal Growth -15.9% 5.7% -11.4% 3.1%
(30) (27) (30) (20)
Industry Adjusted Growth -5,1% 6.1% 8.7% 28.6%
(30) (27) (30) (20)
NCF I Sales
NominalGrowth -23.3% -16.1% -18.2% -6.7%
(30) (27) (30) (20)
Industry Adjusted Growth 48.7% -25.O% -49.6% -21.7%
(30) (27) (30) (20)Table 7
Esttrnated upper bound on costs of distress for a sample of HLTs comprising both MBOs (management buyouts) and leveraged recapitalizations completed
between 1980 and 1989 which subsequently become distressed. Pre-distress figures correspond to last fiscal year before distress onset (t=-l in Table 6).
Total capital is defined as sum of book value of total debt (long-term and short-term), preferred stock (at liquidation preferrence) and market value of equity.
Net capital is total capital less cash and short-term investments. Industry medians are based on universe of firms in same Value Line industry classification
as Conipanv. Financial data on industry comparables is obtained from COMPUSTAT. Estimated pre-distress value of total capital for each Company is
calculated as [product of median industy (net capital / EBITDA) and Company EBITDA] plus Company cash balances at t=-1. Value of total capital
realized during distress is the present value of all payments to capital made from distress onset up to resolutton (inclusive), discounted back to t=- I.
Payments to capital include cash interest and debt principal repaid, dividends paid, equity repurchased. and total value received by capital at distress
resolution, net of proceeds from new equity and debt issues. Market-adjusted value realized is calculated by discounting payments to capital b the rate of
return earned on the CRSP value-weighted portfolio of NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stocks during the distress period. Industry-adlusted value realized is
calculated by discounting payments to capital by the rate of return earned on an equally-weighted portfolio of stocks in each Companys Value Line industn
sector. Upper bound on costs of distress is estimated as difference between value of total pre-distress capital (t=-l) and total capital realized during distress.
Value of Total Capital Market-Adjusted Upper Industry-Adjusted
Realized During Bound on Costs of Upper Bound on Costs
Pre—Distress (t=— I) Distress Distress of Distress
Ind. Median (NetEst. Value of Market-Industry- of Total % of Total
Company EBITDACapital / EBITDA) Total Capital AdiustedAdjusted Nominal Capital t-l Nominal Capital
(5MM) (5MM) (5MM) ($MM) (5MM) (5MM)
American Standard 384 6.4 2,529 2,975 2,784 -446 -17.6% -255 -10.1%
Bucyrus Erie 23 9.1 244 87 82 157 64.4% 162 66.5%
Burlington Industries 270 5.2 1,479 2,195 2,504 -716 -48.4% -1,024 -69.2%
Cherokee 34 5.4 181 108 145 73 40.4% 36 19.7%
Florida Steel 71 5.2 375 249 232 126 33.6% 143 38.2%
Fort Howard 430 4.9 2,105 3,575 3,602 -1,470 -69.9% -1,497 -71.1%
Fruehauf 118 6.6 852 670 714 182 21.4% 139 16.3%
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 355 7.9 2,802 1,965 2,482 837 29.9% 321 11.4%
Harvard Industries 66 5.4 370 325 280 45 12.3% 90 24.4%
Hills Siores 157 6.0 956 549 567 407 42.6% 389 40.7%
Inierco 193 6.2 1,273 1,708 1,569 -435 -34.2% -296 -23.2%
33 6.8 233 155 183 78 33.4% 50 21.7%
Leaseway Transportation 124 4.6 579 376 573 203 35.1% 6 1.0%
R. U. Macy 923 6.8 6,286 5,035 5,680 1,251 19.9% 606 9.6%
Mayflower 55 4.7 275 185 187 90 32.8% 88 32.1%
Morshe Shoe 37 6.2 237 119 99 118 49.7% 138 58.3%
National Gypsum 253 5.5 1,410 735 766 675 47.9% 644 45.7%
Papercrafl 23 4.6 109 123 110 -14 -12.6% -l -1.2%
Payless Cashways 187 6.3 1,212 1,339 1,128 -127 -10.5% 84 6.9%
PayNPak 42 7.1 301 103 110 199 65.9% 191 63,4%
Planironics 17 7.7 144 211 101 -67 -46.3% 43 29.8%
Republic Health 73 8.7 641 544 573 97 15.1% 68 10.6%
Revco 159 8.0 1,315 958 923 357 27.1% 392 29.8%
RJR Nabisco 3,642 7.9 30,t22 28,497 20,475 1,625 5.4% 9,647 32.0%
Seaman Furniture 29 5.5 179 60 103 119 66.4% 76 42.4%
Specialty Equipment 61 8.6 526 246 280 279 53.1% 246 46.7%
Southland 205 5.8 1,212 3,836 3,609 -2,624 -216.6% -2398 -197.9%
Supermarkets General 316 7.8 2,480 NA NA NA NA NA NA
388 7.0 2,781 1,785 2,127 996 35.8% 654 23.5%
Jim Walter 380 7.8 3,099 2,546 2,498 553 17.8% 600 19.4%
Welbilt 37 8.6 323 319 409 4 13% -85 -26.4%
Median 141 6.4 904 549 573 118 24.3% 89 20.7%
Mean 302 6.5 2,210 2,112 1,879 86 9.8% 309 9.7%












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Returnson pre-FILT capital and costs of financial distress as a function of industry performance, transaction value, and time in
distress for a sample of HLTs completed between 1980 and 1989 which subsequently become distressed. industry-adjusted costs
of financial distress are defined in table 7. Number of securities is the number of different debt and preferred stock securities in
the post-FILT capital structure. lILT value is the capital value of the lILT when the HLT is completed. Junk bonds equal one if
the firm issued public non-investment grade bonds to finance the FILl. Bank debt to total debt is as measured in the year before
financial distress. Buyout equals one if a buyout partnership sponsored the lILT. Default equals one if the firm defaulted on its
debt. Time in distress is the number of months between the onset of distress and the resolution of that distress. Industry returns
dummy variables equal I if industry return was in given quartile over pre-HLT to resolution for return on pre-HLT capital
regressions and from the onset of distress until resolution forthe costs of distress regression. Significant at the 1% level ***;at
the 5%level**;andat the 10% level.
Industry-adjustedcosts of financial distress.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Constant 0.644 0.245 0.391 0.096 1.231 1.120 -0.154 0.187
[0.265] [0.181] [0.194] [0.1341 [0.483] [0.522] [0.192] [0.181]





















Adj. R2 0.12 0.00 0.06 -0.04 0.14 0.12 0.01 -0.00
Nobs. 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30